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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three chapters on syndicated loan risk.  
Chapter 1. Determinants of Syndicated Loan Ratings 
Theory suggests that covenants and collateral reduce credit risk for syndicated 
loans, resulting in higher credit ratings. Using the difference between loan ratings and 
issuer (firm) ratings, I examine the predictive power of covenants, collateral, and other 
loan characteristics on credit risk as measured by loan ratings. I find that, all else equal, 
collateral and a subset of covenants improve loan ratings. This positive relation varies by 
issuer (firm) ratings and is more prominent for non-investment-grade issuers. Meanwhile 
higher-rated issuers have a narrower difference between loan ratings and firm ratings. I 
also find that term loans are on average rated lower than credit lines of the same 
characteristics.  Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that higher loan ratings reflect 
higher effective seniority through covenants and collateral. 
Chapter 2. CDS Spread, Credit Spread and Syndicated Loan Characteristics 
Credit spread is a measure of credit risk for syndicated loans. To examine the 
impact of major factors including collateral and covenants on syndicated loan risk, I 
isolate the loan-level risk in two ways. First I use as a proxy for loan-level risk the 
difference between loan spread and issuers’ CDS spread. Second, I use credit spread 
directly by focusing on the firm-year level. Both methods show that collateral and a 
subset of covenants reduce credit risk of syndicated loans.  
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Chapter 3. Covenant Strictness Measures 
 Covenants are an important part of loan contracting. While there is abundant 
empirical research on covenant strictness, there is not yet a definitive measure of 
covenant strictness. Existing measures incorporate only a subset of the covenants in a 
contract. I use loan-level credit risk to compare and rank the effectiveness of several 
common covenant strictness measures. The loan-level risk is measured in two ways, first 
by the difference between issue ratings and issuer ratings and second by using loan credit 
spread with fixed effects at the firm level.  
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Chapter 1. Determinants of Syndicated Loans Ratings 
1.1 Introduction 
 
There have been major changes in the syndicated loan market over the past two 
decades, including credit ratings being assigned to most syndicated loans.  More than 95% 
of syndicated loans with a package size larger than $750 million are rated.
1
 In addition, 
approximately 95% of syndicated loans to Baa-rated borrowers and 80% of A-rated loans 
have financial covenants (Coffey (2005)).  Global syndicated lending reach US$4.7 
trillion during full year 2014, a 9% increase from 2013. The US market accounts for 50% 
of the total volume.
2
 From 1989 to 2009, when companies defaulted and entered 
bankruptcy, secured lenders boasted a higher recovery rate at 71% compared to an 
average of 43.5% by unsecured lenders.
3 
The theoretical literature on syndicated loans predicts that collateral and 
covenants reduce credit risk and should thereby improve credit ratings. Berlin and Mester 
(1992) and Park (2000) show that, by giving institutions the right to renegotiate or call 
loans when convenants are violated, covenants improve the efficiency of financial 
contracting and reduce credit risk. Rajan and Winton (1995) prove that covenants and 
collateral improve effective seniority and increase credit worthiness. However, existing 
empirical research on the impact of syndicated loan characteristics on credit risk has 
primarily focused on loan performance and credit spreads. Some findings do not agree 
with the theoretical predictions. For example, Berger and Udell (1990) point out that 
credit spreads are higher when a loan is secured, suggesting that collateral is associated 
with increased credit risk, with the reason being that banks are more likely to require 
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security for firms with higher risk. John, Lynch and Puri (2003) find similar results on a 
smaller scale, attributing the effect to agency problems. These results could possibly stem 
from the imperfect control of firm characteristics. 
In this paper, I focus on the difference between loan ratings and firm ratings, 
thereby effectively eliminating most firm-level characteristics. Furthermore, while 
existing empirical research primarily examines credit spreads (loan price), I instead focus 
on credit ratings, a direct measure of credit risk. Whereas credit spreads contain firm 
characteristics, the rating difference is free of variations at the firm level.  
Most firms that obtain ratings for their syndicated loans are also rated at the firm 
level. A firm rating is a rating of the senior unsecured debt and debt-like obligations of 
the firm in general. It is not linked to a specific debt contract. In contrast, rating agencies 
rate loans based on the existing firm ratings but incorporate specific risks for the 
particular loan being rated. Since loan ratings include both firm-level and loan-level 
characteristics, I disentangle these two risks by subtracting the firm rating from the loan 
rating, thereby eliminating most firm-level variation. I keep the difference as a measure 
of credit risk specific to a loan. This procedure allows me to explain the variation of this 
difference using loan characteristics.  
Syndicated loans are usually senior and large in size. Indeed, every observation in 
the dataset considered in this paper is a senior loan. Also, loan contracts often include 
various restrictions for the issuer, commonly known as covenants. A loan covenant is a 
requirement for the borrower to meet certain conditions or limit the borrower from 
certain actions. Covenants are an important part of syndicated loan contracting. If a 
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covenant is violated, it is grounds for technical default. However, banks often waive 
covenant violations in return for renegotiating a loan’s terms; for example, they might 
raise the interest rate or require more collateral. Hence, covenants, which are largely 
absent from bonds, protect lenders by raising the lender’s compensation or enhancing its 
recovery value.  
Previous research related to covenants uses different measurements of covenant 
strictness. However, measuring the strictness of covenants is not an easy task, and there is 
not yet a single most effective way to measure covenant strictness.  All existing measures 
only incorporate part of the covenants in a contract. The most commonly used covenant 
intensity index (Bradley and Roberts (2004)) is a weighted average of a seemingly 
arbitrary subset of covenants. The index consists primarily of covenants that restrict 
borrower actions and puts little weight on financial covenants. On the other hand, several 
other covenant strictness measures focus solely on financial covenants (Drucker and Puri 
(2009), Demiroglu and James (2010), Murfin (2012)). One contribution of this paper is to 
measure the importance of covenants in how they affect credit risk as measured by the 
loan’s credit rating relative to the firm’s credit rating. This approach permits one to 
construct a new covenant strictness measure including every contributing covenant with 
an appropriate weight. Since covenants reflect credit worthiness, the stricter the 
covenants are, the larger the rating difference should be.  
There are three major types of covenants: affirmative covenants, negative 
covenants and financial covenants. Affirmative covenants state the actions borrowers 
must take while the loan is outstanding. For example, these covenants often require a 
borrower to pay the lender interest and fees, provide audited financial statements, 
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maintain insurance, and pay taxes. Affirmative covenants are bare minimum 
requirements and exist in virtually all loan contracts, so most loan databases do not report 
them separately. Consequently, they are not included in this study as they do not differ 
across different loans. 
Negative covenants restrict a borrower’s actions in a particular way; for example, 
they might restrict the type and the amount of acquisitions, new issues, and asset sales. 
They may also require mandatory prepayments, such as using the proceeds of a debt issue, 
asset sale, or equity issue to prepay the loan. In this paper, I refer to negative covenants as 
non-financial covenants. Financial covenants, traditionally known as maintenance 
covenants, are often more restrictive than non-financial covenants. They require 
borrowers to maintain stipulated levels of a financial ratio or value, such as minimum 
interest coverage ratio and minimum net worth. If the borrower fails this test, it is then in 
technical default.  
Many syndication loans are secured; that is, they are assigned a claim on specific 
collateral should the firm default. Some theoretical work, such as Khieu, Mullineaux, and 
Yi (2012), predicts that collateral can reduce credit risk by enhancing the lender’s 
recovery value.  I provide empirical evidence consistent with this prediction and contrary 
to prior evidence on the negative relation between collateral and credit spreads.  First, I 
verify empirically that, all else equal, secured loans have better credit ratings than 
unsecured loans. Specifically, on average being secured improves a loan’s rating by one-
half of a notch.
4
 Second, I analyze how the difference between loan and firm ratings is 
associated with each separate covenant, while controlling for the loan’s collateral status. I 
find that different types of covenants have dissimilar effects on loan ratings. Seven out of 
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the twelve total covenants show a significant positive impact on ratings. On average these 
covenants improve loan ratings by a quarter of a notch, which is not unimportant since on 
average loans are rated only one notch higher than the issuing firm’s rating. Next, these 
seven covenants are examined together to identify which ones are most important for 
ratings after controlling for the others. The results show that these covenants are jointly 
positive and significant; they can therefore potentially be used to construct appropriate 
weights for a new covenant strictness measure.  I further divide the covenants into 
subgroups to identify the covenants with the strongest predictive power for loan ratings.   
Third, I provide evidence that term loans tend to be rated lower than revolving 
credit lines. The average magnitude is about a quarter of a notch. Term loans and 
revolving credit lines are structured differently in several ways that can affect their 
relative credit risk. First, the credit risk discrepancy compensates for the options 
embedded in loan contracts. Most term loan contracts allow borrowers to terminate the 
loan early upon a fee (Berg, Sauders and Steffen (2015)). If the borrower’s credit risk 
improves it can refinance the term loan at a lower rate, which creates credit risk for the 
lender. On the other hand, it is standard that revolving lines of credit contain “materially 
adverse change” (MAC) clauses which allow lenders to renege on their promise to 
provide the borrower funds in the future if the borrower’s condition significantly worsens. 
In contrast to term loans in which all funds are provided to the borrower at the initiation 
of the loan contract, MAC clauses can make revolving credit lines less risky. On the other 
hand however, covenants may be relatively more important for the credit risk (and rating) 
of term loans.  
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The results also suggest that the effect of covenants on ratings varies across firms 
at different levels of firm ratings. Loan ratings from investment-grade firms are less 
sensitive to covenants than those from non-investment-grade firms. Further, among the 
non-investment-grade firms, the firms rated in the midrange Ba1-Ba3 are most sensitive 
to covenants. The impact of covenants on loan ratings is greatest for these firms 
compared to firms rated otherwise. This is evidence that the effect of covenants on loan 
ratings varies by the firm’s ratings and is not monotonic.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 provides 
information about data, variables, and summary statistics. Section 1.3 proposes 
hypotheses about the impact of loan characteristics on credit ratings and presents 
preliminary empirical results and analysis. Section 1.4 analyzes the interactions between 
factors and their effects on credit ratings. Section 1.5 contains robustness tests, and 
Section V concludes.   
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1.2 Data, Variables and Summary Statistics 
 
1.2.1 Data and Matching  
 In this paper, I use Moody's syndicated loan ratings at origination from 1995 to 
2012, a period when the majority of syndicated loans were rated. In this dataset, each 
loan has a Moody’s unique identifier and a firm level identifier. In order to match loan 
ratings with firm ratings, I manually collect firm ratings using firm identifiers and match 
the firm ratings with the closest rating date to the loan ratings. 
 Moody’s database maintains three types of firm level ratings. The most 
commonly used rating that measures the firm’s credit risk is the long term issuer rating, 
which rates firm’s long term senior unsecured debt and debt-like obligations. However, 
not every firm has a long term issuer rating. For these firms, I use the long term 
unsecured rating if it is available. This rating measures the same credit risk as the long 
term issuer rating. If neither of the above mentioned firm ratings is available, I use the 
long term corporate family rating as a proxy for the issuer rating.  The long term 
corporate family rating is the long term rating that reflects the relative likelihood of a 
default on a corporate family’s debt and debt like obligations and the expected financial 
loss suffered in the event of default. To justify the use of this proxy, I compare the long 
term corporate family rating with the long term issuer rating of the firms where both 
ratings are available. More than 90% of such firms have identical issuer and corporate 
family ratings. For the remaining 10% of firms, the rating difference is less than one 
notch. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, the empirical results are similar when I 
exclude loans using corporate family ratings.  
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Next, I match the firm rating to the loan rating by date. I first look for firm rating 
updates up to 365 days before the loan is rated. If an updated firm rating within this range 
cannot be found, then the search range is extended to up to 60 days after the loan was 
issued, since a recent update of the firm rating immediately following the loan issue is 
likely a more accurate measure of the firm’s condition at the time the loan was rated. If a 
firm rating does not fall into this time window, it does not appear in the sample. I test 
several different window sizes including 180 days before and 30 day after, 90 days before 
and 15 days after, and only ratings before the loan issue. The results are robust across 
different specifications. This procedure generates 7355 unique loans with both loan 
ratings and firm ratings from 1995 to 2012. 
Next, I gather the characteristics of syndicated loans issued between 1995 and 
2012 from the LPC Dealscan database. I record covenants, collateral, maturity, loan type, 
loan size, starting and ending date, and one-digit SIC industry code. Dealscan uses a 
unique identifier, FacilityID, for each issue at the loan level. Since there are no common 
identifiers of loans between Dealscan and Moody’s, I match the loans in two steps 
starting at the firm level. If a firm is publicly traded and has a ticker in both datasets, the 
firm is matched using the ticker. If a firm does not have a ticker, then I match it by the 
firm name manually, checking name changes and subsidiaries. Once both datasets are 
matched on the firm level, I identify each loan using the starting date, ending date, and 
loan type. This procedure yields a sample of 3,597 loans with both ratings and loan 
characteristics.  Of these, 1,901 (53%) are term loans and 1,696 (47%) are credit lines. 
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1.2.2 Variables and Summary Statistics 
 There are 21 difference notches from Moody’s credit rating service. Each notch 
represents a certain level of credit risk.  The rating symbols range from Aaa to C, with 
Aaa being the highest rated.  Figure 1.1 shows the list of rating symbols and their 
positions. A higher symbol corresponds to a better rating.  To calculate the rating 
difference, I assign a numeric score to each notch, Aaa as 21 and C as 1 (Figure 1.1). 
Since each loan has both a loan rating and a firm rating, it now has two numeric variables, 
loan score and firm score, which are the scores assigned to each rating respectively. 
Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of rating scores as well as the score assignment. The 
average firm score is 8 (B1) and the average loan score is 9 (Ba3). To compare the ratings, 
I subtract the firm score from the loan score to find the dependent variable rating 
difference.  Figure 1.2 shows the distribution of rating differences. The average rating 
difference is 1; that is, loans are on average rated one notch higher than firms. 
The dataset includes 15 different types of financial covenants. I selected the six 
most common financial covenants from the sample: debt to EBITDA, interest coverage, 
capex, fixed charge coverage, leverage ratio, and net worth. These six covenants make up 
more than 95% of the covenants in the sample. Dealscan also reports six non-financial 
covenants: asset sales sweep, debt issuance sweep, equity issuance sweep, excess cash 
flow sweep, insurance proceeds sweep, and dividend restrictions. My analysis includes 
all six of them. There are thus six financial covenants and six non-financial covenants. 
Each covenant has a corresponding indicator variable that equals 1 if that covenant exists 
in the contract and 0 otherwise. Another three variables measure covenant strictness. 
Total financial is the summation of all financial covenant indicators, ranging from 0 to 6. 
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Total non-financial is the summation of all non-financial covenant indicators, ranging 
from 0 to 6.  Total covenant is the summation of all covenants, ranging from 0 to 12. 
Another set of indicator variables are generated collateral and loan type. I compare these 
three covenant measures to the covenant intensity index (CII) proposed by Bradley and 
Roberts (2004). The CII ranges from 0 to 6 and gains 1 point if one of following exists: 
asset sales sweep, debt issuance sweep, equity issuance sweep, 2 or more financial 
covenants, dividend restrictions, and collateral. Appendix A gives detailed definitions of 
all the variables used. Table 1.1 shows the summary statistics of the variables. The 
average firm score is 8 and the average loan score is 9. The average rating difference is 1. 
For indicator variables, the mean value represents the prevalence of the corresponding 
covenants or collateral in the dataset. For example, a mean of 0.475 for the debt to 
EBITDA covenant means that 47.5% of the loans have this covenant. Similarly, 87% of 
the loans are secured.  
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1.3 Empirical setup and basic effects 
 
In this section, I propose hypotheses and provide empirical evidence and 
discussions.  As the theory (Khieu, Mullineaux, and Yi (2012), Rajan and Winton (1995)) 
suggests, I propose the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Covenants and collateral reduce credit risk in a loan contract and improve 
relative credit ratings for syndicated loans.  
Empirical evidence: Using the rating difference as the dependent variable, I 
examine whether and how covenants and collateral predict ratings. I control for loan size 
and maturity and for fixed effects including year, one-digit SIC code, loan purpose and 
firm rating. Firms issue loans for different purposes including general corporate purpose, 
debt refinancing, recapitalization, and LBO or merger and acquisition.  Loans with 
different purposes have varying credit risks and so I control for this variation. Similarly, 
firm rating can be an important determinant of the rating difference. Although I assign 
rating scores across the rating scale uniformly, a difference of one notch at different 
rating levels may represent different risks. Therefore, it is important to controll for firm 
rating as well. The setup for the basic regression is  
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝐹𝐸 
where measure is the one of the 4 covenant strictness measures defined in the last section 
including the popular CII. Table 1.2 shows the effects of covenants and collateral through 
each of the 4 different measures. The positive effects of covenants on the rating 
difference is unanimous across all measures, meaning covenants overall are positively 
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related to the rating difference. Since collateral is a component of CII, Columns 1 and 2 
show how the CII predicts the ratings with and without controlling for collateral.  
Contrary to some existing empirical findings on collateral, my evidence shows 
that a secured loan is rated half a notch higher on average than an unsecured loan, which 
confirms the theoretical prediction that securing a loan reduces credit risk. I achieve this 
result by using the difference between loan rating and firm rating, therefore eliminating 
various unobservable firm characteristics.  
Table 1.2 shows that, all else equal, term loans are on average rated 0.25 notches 
lower than credit lines. Even within a package, term loans and credit lines have very 
different structures and terms; therefore, it is reasonable that different loan types affect 
credit risk differently. In particular, most term loan contracts allow borrowers to cancel 
the loan before it matures by paying a cancellation fee, exposing lenders to a certain 
degree of risk (Berg, Sauders and Steffen (2015)). Moreover, lenders can often withdraw 
part or all of the credit lines in the future if a borrower’s credit condition worsens, due to 
the common “materially adverse change” clause, in which case lenders of credit lines 
face less risk. Nevertheless, a credit line itself is an option in the future. Not knowing 
when or how much the borrower will draw down the credit lines increases risk for the 
lender. Overall, the empirical evidence confirms that credit risk is higher for term loans 
as opposed to credit lines.  Furthermore, loan size has a negative effect on ratings, which 
indicates that large loans are in general less risky. On the other hand, maturity increases 
credit risk, since a longer loan term increases uncertainty. 
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So far I test several covenant measures and confirm that in fact covenants overall 
reduce credit risk. The measures are constructed using various combinations of covenants 
and the coefficients of different covenant measures differ from one another. This 
evidence suggests that some covenants may be more important than others. 
Hypothesis 2: A subset of covenants decreases credit risks and raise credit ratings. 
Among these covenants, the impact differs from one covenant to another.  
Empirical evidence: First, I test each of the twelve covenants individually. A 
individual covenant is used in place of the covenant measure in the basic setup. In fact, 
only seven out of the twelve covenants, including three financial covenants and four non-
financial covenants, appear to predict ratings. Table 1.3 lists each of the seven covenants 
with significant positive loadings of the coefficients. All seven coefficients have similar 
magnitudes. On average, the presence of one of these covenants improves the rating of a 
loan by 0.25 notches, which is half of the predicting power of collateral.  
The joint effects of these seven covenants are shown in Column 1 of Table 1.4, 
where not all coefficients are positive or significant due to correlations among these 
covenants. Because covenants reduce credit risk, loans in need of higher credit ratings are 
likely to take on multiple covenants at once, causing strong correlations among covenants. 
Appendix B shows the covariance matrix of the covenants. The correlation coefficients 
range from 0.48 to 0.88. It appears that only two out of the seven covenants drive most of 
the positive significant effect: interest coverage and dividend restrictions. Column 2 of 
Table 1.4 shows the joint effect of financial covenants in which the interest coverage 
covenant drives the predicting power. Column 3 of Table 1.4 shows the joint effect of 
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non-financial covenants, where the dividend restrictions covenant reflects the rating 
increase. Column 4 of Table 1.4 indicates that these two covenants jointly affect the 
rating in a positive way. Overall, the results support the hypothesis that a subset of 
covenants decrease credit risks and raise credit ratings and that the impact differs from 
one covenant to another. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
1.4 Interaction of the Factors 
 
 Now that I have shown empirically the positive effects of covenants on ratings, I 
further examine the interaction of covenants and other loan characteristics. Table 1.2 and 
Table 1.3 show that term loans and credit lines affect ratings differently. Can they interact 
with covenants and influence the effects of covenants on ratings? 
Hypothesis 3: The same covenants have different effects on credit ratings with different 
loan types. 
  Empirical evidence: Table 1.3 shows that covenants on average improve the 
credit rating by 0.25 notches. To examine the interaction between covenants and loan 
type, I include the interaction term in the basic regression. The empirical setup is as 
follows: 
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡
∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒+𝛽4𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒+𝛽5𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝐹𝐸. 
Table 1.5 shows the different impacts of an individual covenant on ratings 
between a term loan and a credit line. Interestingly, although term loans are generally 
rated lower than credit lines, the positive significant sign of the interaction term indicates 
that covenants are more important for term loans in improving credit ratings. It may be 
that, all else equal, covenants provide a better protection for term loans than for credit 
lines. For example, the fee structures of term loans and credit lines are very different. 
Fees are considerably lower when a credit line is not drawn (Berg, Sauders and Steffen 
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(2015)). In this case, the interest coverage covenant for example is more relevant for term 
loans than for credit lines, as interest rates are much lower on credit lines. 
The interaction between covenants and loan types suggests that other loan 
characteristics may have similar effects on covenants. For instance, covenants may affect 
ratings differently for firms rated at different levels, since credit risk is not uniformly 
distributed across the rating scale. I therefore propose the next hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: The higher a firm is rated, the smaller the rating difference is. With the 
same covenants, all else equal, a lower rated firm has a bigger rating difference than a 
higher rated firm.  
In order to test this theory, the indicator variable is set to 1 for investment grade 
firms and zero otherwise.  I let this variable interact with the covenants while keeping it   
as a control variable in the regression for firm ratings. Below is the setup for the 
regression: 
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑖_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑+𝛽3𝑖_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
+ 𝛽5𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 + 𝛽6𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝐹𝐸. 
Table 1.6 shows unanimous effects of firm ratings on ratings differences across 
all 7 covenants. The negative coefficient for i-rated suggests that investment-grade firms 
have a smaller rating difference than non-investment ones. Moreover, the negative 
significant coefficient for the interaction term indicates that the same covenant improves 
loan ratings more for non-investment-grade firms than for investment-grade firms. 
However, in this dataset, about 90% of the loans are issued by non-investment-grade 
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firms. To see if this effect holds in general for higher-rated firms versus lower-rated firms, 
I separate the sample by population. 
I assign an indicator variable h-rated for the top 50% rated firms. Thus, I separate 
loans into two groups by population. Similarly to Table 1.6, Table 1.7 shows that the 
covenants on lower rated firms have a greater impact on rating differences than those on 
higher rated firms. These data suggest that the impact of covenants on loan ratings is 
related to firm ratings, supporting the hypothesis.   
A given covenant reduces credit risk more for a lower-rated firm than for a higher 
rated firm. If a firm with higher credit risk (lower rated) is willing to take on more 
restrictions, lenders and rating agencies deem such restrictions more credit worthy than 
the same restrictions from a firm with lower credit risk. These findings make sense as it is 
generally harder for high-risk firms to agree on stricter terms since they are more likely to 
violate those terms. This variation could also be due to a ceiling effect; that is, if the firm 
is rated highly, there is not sufficient room for the loan rating to improve. It is likely 
easier to increase ratings by one notch from B2 to B1r than from Aa1 to Aaa. In the most 
extreme case, a loan from an Aaa-rated firm cannot be rated higher no matter how many 
covenants it has. Hence, the ceiling effect may cause the variation between higher-rated 
firms and lower-rated firms. To account for the ceiling effect, I look further into non-
investment-grade firms and propose following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5: Among non-investment-grade firms, firm ratings affect the rating 
difference both directly and through the effects of covenants. 
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 Empirical evidence: I separate non-investment-grade firms into three groups, Ba1 
to Ba3, B1 to B3, and Caa1 to C. I name them Ba-rated, B-rated and C-rated respectively, 
with the indicator variables equal to 1 if a firm falls into that group. The B-rated group 
functions as baseline group whose indicator variable is absent in the regression. I use the 
complete sample, including investment grade firms for comparison. The updated the 
regression setup is  
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡
∗ 𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒+𝛽3𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝐶_𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐶_𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒
+ 𝛽2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑎_𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑎_𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
+ 𝛽5𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 + 𝛽6𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝐹𝐸. 
Table 1.8 shows that the baseline effects of covenants for firms rated from B1 to 
B3 are consistent with previous results. It also shows that the firm rating has a strong 
effect for loans issued by firms rated at Caa1 and below. Loans from this group are on 
average rated 1.75 notches higher. Firms in this group have the highest credit risk. Banks 
often package loans from such firms into collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) and offer 
them to investors. However, institutional practice generally requires CLOs to have a 
minimum average rating of B1 for the loan portfolio. In order to issue loans with 
acceptable ratings, these firms have to add restrictions in loan contracts to boost loan 
rating, which explains the 1.75 notches increase. Within the same group, the negative 
sign of the interaction term shows that covenants are weaker in improving loan ratings 
compared to the baseline group. The same effect holds for firms rated from Ba1 to Ba3, 
just above the firm ratings of the base group. The effect of covenants is most pronounced 
for firms rated from B1 to B3. For any firms outside this range the effect decreases. 
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These trends show that ceiling effect is not the main cause of the narrower rating 
difference at the top and wider rating difference at the bottom. For firms rated from Ba1 
to Ba3, unlike C-rated firms, the rating level makes the rating difference smaller. Overall, 
firm ratings have a strong relationship with the difference between loan ratings and firm 
ratings. This correlation decreases monotonically as the firm rating improves. The effect 
of covenants on the rating difference differs for firms rated at different levels. However, 
this trend is not monotonic. Specifically, for firms rated Ba3 and up, the power of 
covenants weakens as firm ratings become higher. For firms rated B1 and lower, the 
power of covenants weakens as firm ratings become lower.  
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1.5 Robustness Test 
 
1.5.1 Firm Rating Robustness Test 
There are three types of firm ratings: long term issuer rating, long term senior 
unsecured rating, and long term corporate family rating. Similar results hold for each 
subgroup.  
To test a sample of a similar size with consistent firm ratings, I use S&P firm 
ratings obtained from Compustat database. I merge the dataset to Compustat using the 
link provide by Chava and Roberts (2008). The most recent version (2012) of the link is 
used. This procedure generates 3,130 observations with loan ratings from Moody’s and 
firm ratings from S&P. Most tests show the same significance except for Hypothesis 5, 
where I divide non-investment grade firms into smaller groups. While the overall signs 
are consistent with the hypothesis, not all results are significant. However this 
discrepancy may result from the inconsistency between ratings from two different rating 
agencies. 
1.5.2 Package Level, Loan Types, and Financial Firms 
Dealscan reports covenant information at the package level. A package may 
include multiple facilities (loans). Therefore, testing at the package level eliminates the 
possible inflation of the t-statistics. Results show that each hypothesis holds at the 
package level. I further test the hypotheses on two separate datasets, one with only terms 
loans and one with only credit lines.  Overall, the hypotheses hold throughout the testing 
although this setup does not allow me to test the different effects of term loans versus 
credit lines.  
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Financial firms make up 8% of the total firms in the data sample. Previous 
research often excludes financial firms due to the volatile firm characteristics. However, 
because I use the rating difference, I do not need to control for firm characteristics and 
can therefore keep financial firms in the sample. For completeness, I test a sample 
excluding financial firm, and find similar results. 
1.5.3 Time Window for Matching Firm Ratings and Loan Ratings 
It is important to match loan ratings to the appropriate firm ratings around the 
time loans are rated. However, firm ratings are not updated frequently, so it is sometimes 
difficult to find a firm rating that is close enough and prior to the loan rating date. To start, 
I search for firm ratings 365 days before loan ratings. If I cannot find a firm rating during 
that time window, I then search up to 60 days after the loan is rated. The 60-day window 
is very close to the loan rating date and reflects a more accurate credit risk of the firm. It 
is more useful than a rating update more than 365 days before the loan is rated. 
Nonetheless, I consider several time windows to verify the consistency of the results. 
New samples are generated using windows such as 180 days and 90 days before loan 
rating dates, and 30 days, 15 days and 0 day after loan rating dates. I test different 
combinations of the dates. Using the smallest window of 90 days before and 0 day after 
only drops 18% of the total observations, reducing the sample size from 3,597 to 2,950. 
Main results hold across different specifications.  
 In summary, I show that the effects of covenants, collateral and other loan 
characteristics on loan ratings are highly robust to different subsamples and specifications.  
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1.6 Conclusion 
 
 This paper establishes that collateral, covenants, loan types and firm ratings are 
important determinants of syndicated loan ratings, a measure of credit risk. I test the 
predictions of existing theories on the impact of collateral and covenants on credit risk 
and find that, contrary to existing empirical evidence, both factors reduce credit risk and 
improve ratings. Overall, collateral and covenants improve the effective seniority of a 
loan, resulting in a higher credit rating. The data also suggest that, all else equal, term 
loans are rated lower than credit lines, which can be explained by the options embedded 
in both loan types. Firm ratings have a profound effect on loan ratings. The higher the 
firm is rated, the lower the loan rating is relative to the firm rating.  
 I also show that the impact of covenants on loan ratings depends on loan types 
and firm ratings. Covenants have a stronger effect for term loans on improving credit 
worthiness, suggesting that covenants are more relevant for term loans. The effect of 
covenants is the strongest for firms rated from B1 to B3. The power of covenants on 
credit ratings weakens for firms rated away from the B1 to B3 range. 
 Overall, these findings show important implications for research on credit ratings 
and loan contracting, and shed light on a new approach of covenant strictness measure.  
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1.7 Figures 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Rating Scores and Distribution 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Figure 1.2 Rating Differences and Distribution 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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1.8 Tables 
 
Table 1.1 Summary Statistics 
This table provides summary statistics for ratings scores, collateral, covenants, and other 
loan characteristics. For indicator variables, mean values in column 2 show the prevalence of 
this characteristic in the dataset. The sample is based on syndicated loan market from 1995 to 
2012. Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
N mean std. dev min max 
           
firm_score 3,597 7.984 2.506 2 21 
loan_score 3,597 9.011 2.219 3 21 
rating_diff 3,597 1.027 1.316 -3 8 
loan_type 3,597 0.528 0.499 0 1 
asset sales sweep 3,597 0.400 0.490 0 1 
debt issuance sweep 3,597 0.352 0.478 0 1 
equity issuance sweep 3,597 0.241 0.428 0 1 
excess CF sweep 3,597 0.363 0.481 0 1 
insurance proceeds sweep 3,597 0.325 0.468 0 1 
secured 3,597 0.870 0.336 0 1 
dividend restrictions 3,597 0.465 0.499 0 1 
log(loan amount) 3,597 6.218 1.061 1.243 9.989 
debt to EBITDA 3,597 0.475 0.499 0 1 
interest coverage 3,597 0.360 0.480 0 1 
capex 3,597 0.249 0.432 0 1 
fixed charge coverage 3,597 0.193 0.394 0 1 
leverage ratio 3,597 0.0520 0.222 0 1 
net worth 3,597 0.0614 0.240 0 1 
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Table 1.2 Covenant Strictness Measures and Collateral  
This table provides results of a linear regression of the rating difference on four 
covenant strictness measures, collateral, loan type, and control variables. Columns (1) 
and (2) provide results using covenant intensity index (CII) as the measure, with and 
without collateral. Columns (3) to (5) use total financial covenants, total non-financial 
covenants and all covenants as measures. Variables are defined in Appendix A. I report 
t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Covenant 
intensity 
index 
Covenant 
intensity 
index 
Total 
financial 
covenants 
Total non-
financial 
covenants 
Total 
covenants 
            
Measure 0.0636*** 0.0681*** 0.0870*** 0.0362*** 0.0316*** 
 
(4.035) (4.343) (4.251) (2.820) (3.675) 
Secured 0.451** 
 
0.492*** 0.513*** 0.498*** 
 
(2.360) 
 
(2.589) (2.690) (2.616) 
Size 0.289*** 0.289*** 0.292*** 0.294*** 0.291*** 
 
(10.47) (10.45) (10.61) (10.61) (10.52) 
Maturity -0.212*** -0.200** -0.205*** -0.211*** -0.210*** 
 
(-2.710) (-2.566) (-2.634) (-2.702) (-2.695) 
Type -0.255*** -0.254*** -0.253*** -0.257*** -0.255*** 
 
(-6.715) (-6.684) (-6.669) (-6.765) (-6.721) 
      Issuer Rating FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Loan Purpose FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
One Digit SIC FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 
Adjusted R-squared 0.567 0.566 0.568 0.565 0.567 
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Table 1.3 Individual Covenants 
This table provides results of a linear regression of the rating difference on covenants individually, 
collateral, loan type and control variables. Columns (1) to (7) report the 7 out of 12 covenants that 
show significant effects. Variables are defined in Appendix A. I report t-statistics in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Min. 
Interest 
Coverage 
Max. Debt 
to 
EBITDA 
Max. 
Capex 
Insurance 
Proceeds 
Sweep 
Asset 
Sales 
Sweep 
Debt 
Issuance 
Sweep 
Dividend 
Restrictions 
                
Covenant 0.313*** 0.274*** 0.257*** 0.255*** 0.224*** 0.168*** 0.304*** 
 
(4.855) (3.786) (4.090) (3.907) (3.471) (2.609) (4.858) 
Collateral 0.498*** 0.509*** 0.506*** 0.477** 0.537*** 0.514*** 0.545*** 
 
(2.627) (2.677) (2.664) (2.501) (2.827) (2.696) (2.876) 
Size 0.285*** 0.305*** 0.287*** 0.292*** 0.292*** 0.295*** 0.286*** 
 
(10.33) (11.13) (10.37) (10.59) (10.55) (10.67) (10.36) 
Maturity -0.207*** -0.209*** -0.223*** -0.212*** -0.219*** -0.213*** -0.210*** 
 
(-2.652) (-2.676) (-2.857) (-2.710) (-2.798) (-2.716) (-2.691) 
Type -0.252*** -0.253*** -0.251*** -0.257*** -0.255*** -0.258*** -0.252*** 
 
(-6.664) (-6.680) (-6.608) (-6.767) (-6.730) (-6.778) (-6.665) 
        
Issuer Rating FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Loan Purpose FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
One Digit SIC FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 
Adjusted R-squared 0.569 0.567 0.567 0.567 0.566 0.565 0.569 
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Table 1.4 Joint Effect of Covenants 
This table provides results of a linear regression of the rating difference on covenants 
jointly, collateral, loan type and control variables. Column (1) provides results of the 
joint effect of the 7 relevant covenants. Column (2) provides results of the joint effect 
of 3 financial covenants. Column (3) provides results of the joint effect of 4 non-
financial covenants. Column (3) provides results of the joint effect of the 2 most 
important covenants. Variables are defined in Appendix A. I report t-statistics in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  All Financial Non-Financial Best 
Interest Coverage 0.214** 0.216** 
 
0.218*** 
 
(2.513) (2.527) 
 
(3.056) 
Debt to EBITDA 0.0419 0.0764 
  
 
(0.443) (0.905) 
  Capex 0.0799 0.111 
  
 
(0.828) (1.285) 
  Dividend Restrictions 0.303*** 
 
0.368*** 0.212*** 
 
(2.780) 
 
(3.445) (3.060) 
Asset Sales Sweep -0.0577 
 
-0.0363 
 
 
(-0.339) 
 
(-0.214) 
 Debt Issuance Sweep -0.310** 
 
-0.224 
 
 
(-2.195) 
 
(-1.617) 
 Insurance Proceeds Sweep 0.176 
 
0.189* 
 
 
(1.546) 
 
(1.659) 
 Secured 0.508*** 0.487** 0.536*** 0.513*** 
 
(2.645) (2.569) (2.788) (2.710) 
Size 0.282*** 0.286*** 0.287*** 0.278*** 
 
(10.07) (10.28) (10.40) (10.06) 
Maturity 
-
0.202*** 
-
0.213*** -0.204*** 
-
0.209*** 
 
(-2.592) (-2.725) (-2.611) (-2.687) 
Type 
-
0.247*** 
-
0.250*** -0.252*** 
-
0.250*** 
 
(-6.526) (-6.593) (-6.648) (-6.607) 
     Observations 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 
Adjusted R-squared 0.571 0.569 0.569 0.570 
FE(Rating, Purpose, Year, SIC) YES YES YES YES 
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Table 1.5 Term Loans versus Credit Lines 
This table provides results of a linear regression of the rating difference on individual covenants, loan 
type, interaction of covenants and loan type, collateral, and control variables. Columns (1) to (7) 
provide results with 7 relevant covenants. Variables are defined in Appendix A. I report t-statistics in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Min. 
Interest 
Coverage 
Max. 
Debt to 
EBITDA 
Max. 
Capex 
Insurance 
Proceeds 
Sweep 
Asset 
Sales 
Sweep 
Debt 
Issuance 
Sweep 
Dividend 
Restrictions 
                
Covenant 0.168** 0.0941 0.164* 0.101 0.0481 -0.0174 0.149** 
 
(2.237) (1.275) (1.948) (1.326) (0.639) (-0.230) (2.039) 
Type -0.355*** -0.403*** -0.309*** -0.359*** -0.395*** -0.388*** -0.385*** 
 
(-7.624) (-7.683) (-7.041) (-7.741) (-8.084) (-8.200) (-7.730) 
Covenant*Type 0.268*** 0.291*** 0.197** 0.276*** 0.317*** 0.328*** 0.284*** 
 
(3.765) (4.184) (2.505) (3.807) (4.504) (4.587) (4.078) 
Secured 0.496*** 0.532*** 0.522*** 0.488** 0.553*** 0.528*** 0.543*** 
 
(2.622) (2.811) (2.747) (2.568) (2.921) (2.781) (2.876) 
Size 0.284*** 0.286*** 0.307*** 0.292*** 0.294*** 0.298*** 0.284*** 
 
(10.32) (10.36) (11.20) (10.62) (10.67) (10.82) (10.33) 
Maturity -0.210*** -0.216*** -0.210*** -0.210*** -0.219*** -0.213*** -0.215*** 
 
(-2.705) (-2.782) (-2.693) (-2.703) (-2.818) (-2.735) (-2.765) 
        Observations 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.572 0.571 0.568 0.570 0.570 0.569 0.572 
Firm Rating FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Loan Purpose FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
One Digit SIC FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 1.6 Investment Grade versus Non-Investment Grade 
This table provides results of a linear regression of the rating difference on individual covenants, 
investment grade indicator, interaction of covenants and investment grade indicator, loan type, 
collateral, and control variables. Columns (1) to (7) provide results with 7 relevant covenants. 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. I report t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Min. 
Interest 
Coverage 
Max. 
Debt to 
EBITDA 
Max. 
Capex 
Insurance 
Proceeds 
Sweep 
Asset 
Sales 
Sweep 
Debt 
Issuance 
Sweep 
Dividend 
Restrictions 
                
Covenant 0.159*** 0.157*** 0.220*** 0.217*** 0.227*** 0.205*** 0.250*** 
 
(2.808) (2.813) (3.515) (3.872) (4.047) (3.610) (4.463) 
i-rated -0.635*** -0.643*** -0.760*** -0.616*** -0.596*** -0.593*** -0.546*** 
 
(-3.837) (-3.834) (-4.888) (-3.883) (-3.730) (-3.652) (-3.229) 
Covenant*i-rated -0.402** -0.322* -0.0890 -1.776*** -1.293*** -1.343*** -0.488*** 
 
(-2.222) (-1.707) (-0.133) (-4.305) (-3.616) (-3.656) (-2.666) 
Secured 0.878*** 0.889*** 0.847*** 0.920*** 0.920*** 0.946*** 0.912*** 
 
(6.115) (6.183) (5.886) (6.311) (6.342) (6.413) (6.343) 
amount 0.261*** 0.259*** 0.273*** 0.261*** 0.260*** 0.264*** 0.255*** 
 
(11.02) (10.79) (11.66) (11.11) (11.02) (11.20) (10.78) 
maturity -0.114 -0.123* -0.115 -0.124* -0.133* -0.125* -0.121* 
 
(-1.546) (-1.663) (-1.563) (-1.680) (-1.808) (-1.698) (-1.646) 
Loan type -0.280*** -0.279*** -0.283*** -0.281*** -0.280*** -0.282*** -0.276*** 
 
(-6.299) (-6.272) (-6.360) (-6.345) (-6.322) (-6.369) (-6.212) 
        Observations 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.270 0.269 0.270 0.275 0.274 0.273 0.273 
Loan Purpose FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
One Digit SIC FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 1.7 Upper Half Rated versus Lower Half Rated 
This table provides results of a linear regression of the rating difference on individual covenants, top 
50% rated indicator, interaction of covenants and top 50% rated indicator, loan type, collateral, and 
control variables. Columns (1) to (7) provide results with 7 relevant covenants. Variables are defined 
in Appendix A. I report t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Min. 
Interest 
Coverage 
Max. 
Debt to 
EBITDA 
Max. 
Capex 
Insurance 
Proceeds 
Sweep 
Asset 
Sales 
Sweep 
Debt 
Issuance 
Sweep 
Dividend 
Restrictions 
                
Covenant 0.253*** 0.336*** 0.179** 0.323*** 0.320*** 0.309*** 0.367*** 
 
(3.667) (5.235) (2.449) (4.796) (4.877) (4.688) (5.698) 
h-rated -1.076*** -1.005*** -1.101*** -1.031*** -1.024*** -0.998*** -1.003*** 
 
(-17.46) (-14.84) (-18.67) (-16.83) (-15.80) (-16.06) (-15.13) 
Covenant*h-rated -0.107 -0.237*** 0.0152 -0.231** -0.195** -0.290*** -0.231** 
 
(-1.133) (-2.585) (0.143) (-2.311) (-2.063) (-2.979) (-2.543) 
Secured 0.976*** 0.969*** 0.961*** 0.958*** 0.951*** 0.987*** 0.966*** 
 
(11.06) (10.92) (10.70) (10.57) (10.43) (10.90) (10.89) 
Amount 0.319*** 0.311*** 0.332*** 0.317*** 0.316*** 0.320*** 0.314*** 
 
(14.40) (13.93) (15.16) (14.34) (14.28) (14.49) (14.22) 
Maturity -0.141** -0.148** -0.134* -0.142** -0.146** -0.138** -0.138** 
 
(-2.060) (-2.163) (-1.949) (-2.072) (-2.124) (-2.015) (-2.019) 
Loan type -0.292*** -0.289*** -0.296*** -0.297*** -0.295*** -0.295*** -0.291*** 
 
(-7.073) (-7.007) (-7.163) (-7.209) (-7.171) (-7.155) (-7.065) 
        Observations 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.370 0.372 0.368 0.371 0.371 0.371 0.374 
Loan Purpose FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
One Digit SIC FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 1.8 Effects of Firm Ratings on Covenants 
Firms are divided into 4 groups based on firm ratings. Investment-grade firms are indicated as I-
rated. Ba1- to Ba3-rated firms are indicated as Ba-rated. B1- to B3-rated firms are indicated as B-
rated. Caa1 and below are indicated at C-rated. Using B-rated as a baseline, firm rating level and 
interactions with covenants are added to the regression. This table provides results of a linear 
regression of the rating difference on individual covenants, firm rating indicators, interaction of 
covenants and firm rating indicators, loan type, collateral, and control variables. Columns (1) to (7) 
provide results with 7 relevant covenants. Variables are defined in Appendix A. I report t-statistics 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Min. 
Interest 
Coverage 
Max. Debt 
to 
EBITDA 
Max. 
Capex 
Insurance 
Proceeds 
Sweep 
Asset Sales 
Sweep 
Debt 
Issuance 
Sweep 
Dividend 
Restrictions 
                
Covenant 0.329*** 0.283*** 0.282*** 0.336*** 0.305*** 0.292*** 0.348*** 
 
(5.422) (4.404) (4.854) (5.587) (5.137) (4.875) (6.002) 
C-rated 1.767*** 1.723*** 1.717*** 1.741*** 1.773*** 1.751*** 1.731*** 
 
(21.11) (21.21) (17.85) (20.12) (19.03) (19.77) (18.36) 
Covenant*C-rated -0.391** -0.332* -0.178 -0.321** -0.344** -0.324** -0.212 
 
(-2.530) (-1.949) (-1.259) (-2.161) (-2.414) (-2.216) (-1.517) 
Ba-rated -0.680*** -0.662*** -0.690*** -0.611*** -0.580*** -0.546*** -0.595*** 
 
(-8.111) (-8.826) (-6.784) (-7.467) (-6.552) (-6.715) (-6.209) 
Covenant*Ba-rated -0.213* -0.316** -0.170 -0.373*** -0.360*** -0.491*** -0.312*** 
 
(-1.842) (-2.464) (-1.390) (-3.138) (-3.095) (-4.228) (-2.640) 
I-rated -0.890*** -1.025*** -0.928*** -0.858*** -0.865*** -0.820*** -0.858*** 
 
(-5.874) (-7.107) (-6.061) (-5.767) (-5.829) (-5.427) (-5.558) 
Covenant*I-rated -0.575*** -0.244 -0.429** -1.743*** -1.234*** -1.334*** -0.529*** 
 
(-3.532) (-0.412) (-2.538) (-4.769) (-3.895) (-4.096) (-3.235) 
Secured 0.614*** 0.620*** 0.611*** 0.695*** 0.675*** 0.736*** 0.626*** 
 
(4.804) (4.806) (4.773) (5.293) (5.203) (5.565) (4.889) 
Size 0.260*** 0.273*** 0.259*** 0.263*** 0.263*** 0.268*** 0.256*** 
 
(12.12) (12.79) (11.94) (12.29) (12.25) (12.54) (11.92) 
Maturity -0.182*** -0.175*** -0.192*** -0.182*** -0.185*** -0.175*** -0.184*** 
 
(-2.797) (-2.684) (-2.951) (-2.815) (-2.846) (-2.695) (-2.842) 
Type -0.286*** -0.291*** -0.286*** -0.289*** -0.289*** -0.289*** -0.285*** 
 
(-7.313) (-7.437) (-7.301) (-7.418) (-7.396) (-7.417) (-7.307) 
        
Observations 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 
Adjusted R-squared 0.437 0.434 0.435 0.439 0.437 0.438 0.438 
Loan Purpose FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
One Digit SIC FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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1. Characteristics and performance of Moody’s-rated U.S. syndicated bank loans 
(Moody’s special comment 2004) 
2. Global syndicated loan review, Thomson Reuters 2015 
3. A Primer on Syndicated Term Loans, Payden & Rygel 2013 
4. Moody’s credit ratings include 21 levels, known as notches, with Aaa being a highest 
and C being the lowest. One notch difference is the difference between neighboring 
notches, such as Aaa and Aa1, Ba1 and Ba2. 
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Chapter 2. CDS Spread, Credit Spread and Syndicated Loan Characteristics 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Syndicated loans have been playing a major role in the capital market. From 2010 
to 2015, the annual global syndicated loan market has steadily risen from 3 trillion dollars 
to 4.5 trillion dollars. Understanding the risk of this large market is becoming increasing 
important. Various factors contribute to the riskiness of a syndicated loan. Generally 
speaking, overall loan risk is closely related to the borrower’s risk, yet the specifications 
of each individual loan contract determine the variation in the riskiness of different loans 
on top of the borrower’s risk. Knowing this, I claim that the overall risk of a loan is made 
up of the borrower’s firm-level risk and the specific loan-level risk. Loan-level risks vary 
based on the loan characteristics independent of firm-level risk. In this paper I aim to 
isolate loan-level risk with which I examine different impacts of loan characteristics on 
the riskiness of the loan.  
 Collateral and covenants are two major categories of loan characteristics. Other 
loan characteristics include loan size, maturity, loan purpose, and loan type. Existing 
empirical research on the impact of syndicated loan characteristics on credit risk has 
primarily focused on loan performance and credit spreads. Credit spread is the difference 
between the yield of a loan and the risk free rate of the same maturity. Naturally, if a loan 
is riskier, it needs to have a higher spread to compensate for the risk of the loan. 
Therefore, credit spread is an accurate measure of the market risk. However, credit spread 
contains both the borrower’s firm-level risk as well as loan-level risk. In order to use it 
directly, one has to control for the firm characteristic in the empirical setting. Several 
35 
 
existing research has done just that. For example, Berger and Udell (1990) point out that 
credit spreads are higher when a loan is secured, suggesting that collateral is associated 
with increased credit risk, with the reason being that banks are more likely to require 
collateral for firms with higher risk. John, Lynch and Puri (2003) find similar results on a 
smaller scale, attributing the effect to agency problems. These results contradict 
theoretical predictions and could possibly stem from the imperfect control of firm 
characteristics due to endogeneity problems. 
The theoretical literature on syndicated loans predicts that collateral and 
covenants reduce credit risk and should thereby improve credit ratings. Berlin and Mester 
(1992) and Park (2000) show that, by giving institutions the right to renegotiate or call 
loans when convenants are violated, covenants improve the efficiency of financial 
contracting and reduce credit risk. Rajan and Winton (1995) prove that covenants and 
collateral improve effective seniority and increase credit worthiness. 
To separate the loan-level risk from the firm-level risk, I look for a measure solely 
reflecting the firm risk. The ideal candidate would be the credit spread of a general long 
term senior unsecured bond with no provisions and therefore representing the firm risk. 
Such bond would ideally have flexible terms to match the terms of syndicated loan terms.  
Credit Default Swap (CDS) spread has such properties mentioned above. It is proven that 
CDS spread measures the long term credit risk of a firm. CDS spreads reflect the 
market’s perception of credit risk. In any efficient market the return for taking a risk must 
equal the loss expected as a result of that risk. If this not the case, for instance, were the 
expected loss under a CDS contract to be lower than the spread paid for the protection, 
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there would be a pure arbitrage opportunity. Given this efficiency axiom, we can 
calculate the expected loss under a contract directly from its market price. 
With loan spreads and CDS spreads, there are two ways to isolate loan-level risk. 
I first take the difference between the loan spread and the CDS spread. Then the loan 
characteristics alone should be able to explain the variation in that difference where there 
is no need to control for firm level variance as the firm risk is subtracted away. Second, 
instead of taking the difference, I use the CDS spread as control variable, allowing the 
coefficient of CDS spread to vary from 1. Unfortunately, due to the small sample size I 
collected, the setup using CDS spread does not generate meaningful results.  
Next, in order access a larger unbiased sample, instead of isolating the loan-level 
risk, I tackle within firm variation instead. That is, I only look at the firms that issue 
multiple loans within the year by using firm-year fixed effect. As in a relatively short 
time frame a firm’s risk profile tends not to change, therefore the variations among loan 
spread are solely the variations of the loan-level risk that can be explained by loan 
characteristics. Using this design, I find that collateral is negatively correlated with credit 
spread, which means having collateral makes a loan less risky. This result agrees with 
what the theory suggests and negates the existing empirical findings. The results also 
show that subset of the financial covenants categorized as performance covenants also 
reduces credit risk. Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) first introduce this categorization 
together with capital covenants. On the other hand, a set of capital covenants and a set of 
non-financial covenants are positively related to credit spread, which means the market 
views these covenants as associated with higher risk. 
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In general there are two major types of covenants of research interest: financial 
covenants and non-financial covenants. Financial covenants, traditionally known as 
maintenance covenants, are often more restrictive than non-financial covenants. They 
require borrowers to maintain stipulated levels of a financial ratio or value, such as 
minimum interest coverage ratio and minimum net worth. The borrower is then required 
to be tested quarterly to meet these requirements. If the borrower fails this test, it is then 
in technical default. Non-financial covenants are also known as negative covenants which 
restrict a borrower’s actions only when the borrower decides to make certain financial 
decisions. For example, they might restrict the type and the amount of acquisitions, new 
issues, and asset sales. They may also require mandatory prepayments, such as using the 
proceeds of a debt issue, asset sale, or equity issue to prepay the loan. Some of the non-
financial covenants are also known as “sweeps”. For instance, a debt issuance sweep 
discourages the borrower from issuing new debt but requesting 50% to 100% percent of 
the proceeds towards the existing debt.  
Other loan characteristics are also closely related to loan risk. For instance, I also 
find that all else equal, term loans and credit lines respond differently to different 
covenants. Especially leverage ratio, net worth and debt issuance sweep are more relevant 
to credit lines.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides 
information about data, variables, and summary statistics. Section 2.3 introduces different 
empirical setups and presents the results and explanations. Section 2.4 concludes.   
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2.2 Data, Variables and Summary Statistics 
 
I use two major databases in this paper. DealScan database provides detailed 
information on syndicated loans, including loan characteristics and pricing. I use all-in-
drawn spread as the credit spread, as it is commonly used as credit spread for empirical 
research. Dealscan’s loan characteristics includes covenants, collateral, maturity, loan 
type, loan size, starting and ending date, and one-digit SIC industry code. I download 
from Bloomberg the CDS spread data that matches the date and the maturity of loan data. 
Due to copyright restriction, only a small set of CDS data can be downloaded from 
Bloomberg. I match CDS spread with loan spread by firm ticker, date, and maturity, so 
that both spreads represents the same company at the exact same point in time. After 
dropping the observations with missing values, I have in total 633 valid observations. 
Most of the loans are issued after 2010 and they tend to be covenant-lite. Figure 2.1 
shows the distribution of the difference by subtracting CDS spread from loan spread. 
Table I shows the summary statistics.  
As shown in Table I, collateral and covenants are dummy variables. The mean 
value of a dummy variable shows the percentage of the prevalence of the variable. Due to 
the limited sample size and time period, not many loans contains covenants information. 
Dealscan reports 21 different financial covenants and 6 different non-financial covenants.  
6 financial covenants are include in the analysis with make up for more than 95% of the 
total sample population. These financial covenants are Debt to EBITDA, Interest 
Coverage, Debt to Net Worth, Fixed Charge Coverage, Leverage Ratio, and Net Worth. I 
include all of the 6 non-financial covenants in the analysis, which are Asset Issuance 
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Sweep, Debt Issuance Sweep, Equity Issuance Sweep, Excess CF Sweep, Insurance 
Sweep, and Dividend Restriction.  
Although the results from Table 2.1 does not fully reflect the effect of covenants 
on loan risk, the impact of collateral is however very significant. The negative sign shows 
that collateral is negatively related to credit spread, which means collateral on average 
indicates a smaller credit spread, therefore indicating a lower risk.  
Similarly, I construct another sample without the CDS spread data. After cleaning 
missing values, I manage to work with a sample with 58,329 observations. Table 2.2 
exhibits the summary statistics. Compared to Table 2.1, capital expenditure is added to 
the list of financial covenants. This sample has a healthy distribution of various covenants, 
with percentages matching the entire syndicated loans database from Dealscan. 
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2.3 Empirical Analysis and Explanations 
  
2.3.1 Loan Spread and CDS Spread 
 As an initial analysis, I include collateral and all covenants in the regression, 
controlling for size, maturity, loan type and applying year and one digit SIC industry 
fixed effect. Table 2.3 shows the results from the following regression, 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑_𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝐹𝐸 
In Table 2.3, collateral is negatively correlated to the spread difference, contributing to a 
lower loan spread. This means collateral is related to lower risk. Net worth covenant and 
asset sales sweep are also contributing to a lower spread therefore a lower market risk. 
However, debt to net worth covenant correlates to a higher spread in this case. Yet when I 
put each covenant individually in the regression, the effect of debt to net worth 
disappears. Therefore, this positive correlation may be due to correlation with other 
variables or the small and possibly biased sample size 
 The individual effect of each covenant is shown in Table 2.4. None of the 
covenants are significant individually. I conclude that the sample size might be too biased 
or too small.  
 Another way to control for firm level variation is to use CDS spread as a control 
variable as opposed to taking the difference.  Table 2.5 shows the results. Instead of 
having a coefficient of 1 in case of taking the difference, the CDS spread has a coefficient 
of about 0.375. The effect of collateral is no longer significant in this case.  
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2.3.2 Loan spread and firm-year fixed effect 
 As a matter of fact there is a large number of borrows issuing multiple loans 
within a year. The firm-year fixed effect perfectly controls the firm level variation and 
minimizes the change in the risk profile over time. A smaller time window than one year 
certainly guarantee an even fewer variations in the firm’s risk profile, however any 
windows smaller than one year does not contain enough observation to generate an 
inference. Table 2.6 shows the effect with all covenants. As a comparison, Column (1) 
does not have year fixed effects, while the rest of the columns all have firm-year fixed 
effects. From Column (2), interest coverage, fixed charge coverage and insurance sweep 
reduces credit spreads. This effect is consistent across different groups in Column (2) to 
(5). On the other hand, Debt to EBITDA, Capital Expenditure, Net Worth, Asset Sales 
Sweep, and Debt Issuance Sweep are positively correlated to credit spread. This means, 
jointly, the market thinks these covenants are related to a higher market risk 
For a detailed analysis, Table 2.7 shows how covenants individually affect credit 
spread. The results are very similar to the joint effect shown in Table 2.6. Christensen and 
Nikolaev (2012) show that financial covenants falls into two groups: performance 
covenants and capital covenants. Based on contract theory, they argue that capital 
covenants control agency problems by aligning debt holder–shareholder interests, while 
performance covenants serve as trip wires that limit agency problems via the transfer of 
control to lenders in states where the value of their claim is at risk. Companies trade off 
these mechanisms. Capital covenants impose costly restrictions on the capital structure, 
while performance covenants require contractible accounting information to be available. 
Consistent with these arguments, they show that use of performance covenants relative to 
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capital covenants is positively associated with (1) the financial constraints of the 
borrower, (2) the extent to which accounting information portrays credit risk, (3) the 
likelihood of contract renegotiation, and (4) the presence of contractual restrictions on 
managerial actions.  
 Based on their findings, I separate the financial covenants into 2 groups: 
performance covenants: Debt to EBITDA, Interest Coverage, Fixed Charge Coverage; 
and capital covenants: Capital Expenditure, Debt to Net Worth, Leverage Ratio, Net 
Worth. I also group all non-financial covenants together. By doing this, I create three new 
convent variables. Table 2.8 shows the effects of grouped covenants. Obviously 
performance covenants are individually and jointly negatively related to credit spread, 
which means the market indeed sees performance covenants as trip wires and believes 
they reduce credit risk. Capital covenants are not significant by themselves but positively 
related to credit spread jointly with other groups. On the other hand, the market sees the 
existence of non-financial covenants as a sign of riskiness with these covenants positively 
correlated with credit spread. These findings agree with Christensen and Nikolaev (2012).  
 Lastly, different covenants have varying impact on term loans versus credit lines. 
Table 2.9 shows the difference. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I examine the impact of collateral and covenants on syndicated loan 
risk, measured by credit spread.  Collateral is consistently negatively correlated with 
credit spread, regardless of model specifications. This result is consistent with theoretical 
predictions and shows with appropriate control for firm level variance having collateral 
always reduces credit risk. 
Covenants, on the other hand, have various impacts on credit risk. Following a 
classification by Christensen and Nikolaev (2012), I show that performance covenants are 
overall negatively correlated with credit spread, as they serve as protections agency 
problems via the transfer of control to lenders in states where the value of their claim is at 
risk. As a result, performance covenants reduce credit risk. The results also show that 
capital covenants and other non-financial covenants are related to higher credit spread. 
The existence of these covenants might be viewed by the market as risky signal of the 
underlying debt obligations.   
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2.5 Figures 
 
Figure 2.1 Distribution of (Loan Spread – CDS Spread) 
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2.6 Tables 
 
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics for CDS and loan spread 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
Loan Spread 633 97.61 86.14 5 737.5 
Loan - CDS spread 633 1.241 93.23 -778.6 622.5 
CDS Spread 633 96.37 124.6 4.500 991.0 
Debt to EBITDA 633 0.221 0.415 0 1 
Interest Coverage 633 0.167 0.374 0 1 
Debt to Net Worth 633 0.0363 0.187 0 1 
Fixed Charge Coverage 633 0.0695 0.255 0 1 
Leverage Ratio 633 0.175 0.381 0 1 
Net Worth 633 0.0806 0.272 0 1 
Maturity 633 4.024 0.312 2.079 4.787 
Total Financial Covenants 633 0.768 0.876 0 3 
Asset Issuance Sweep 633 0.0332 0.179 0 1 
Debt Issuance Sweep 633 0.0253 0.157 0 1 
Equity Issuance Sweep 633 0.0205 0.142 0 1 
Excess CF Sweep 633 0.00948 0.0970 0 1 
Insurance Sweep 633 0.0158 0.125 0 1 
Total Sweeps 633 0.104 0.561 0 4 
Secured 633 0.561 0.497 0 1 
Dividend Restriction 633 0.166 0.372 0 1 
Total number of  Covenants 633 0.872 1.111 0 6 
Amount 633 7.546 1.000 3.242 10.85 
Term Loan 633 0.117 0.322 0 1 
Refinancing  Indicator 633 0.788 0.409 0 1 
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Table 2.2 Summary statistics for loan spread of a larger sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
            
Loan Spread 58,329 277.5 172.4 10 1,750 
Term Loan 58,329 0.428 0.495 0 1 
Debt to EBITDA 58,329 0.338 0.473 0 1 
Interest Coverage 58,329 0.243 0.429 0 1 
Capital Expenditure 58,329 0.140 0.347 0 1 
Debt to Net Worth 58,329 0.0310 0.173 0 1 
Fixed Charge 
Coverage 58,329 0.212 0.409 0 1 
Leverage Ratio 58,329 0.0824 0.275 0 1 
Net Worth 58,329 0.159 0.366 0 1 
Maturity 58,329 3.852 0.622 0 5.620 
Asset Sales Sweep 58,329 0.269 0.444 0 1 
Debt Issuance Sweep 58,329 0.206 0.404 0 1 
Equity Issuance 
Sweep 58,329 0.171 0.377 0 1 
Excess CF Sweep 58,329 0.169 0.375 0 1 
Insurance Sweep 58,329 0.173 0.378 0 1 
Secured 58,329 0.825 0.380 0 1 
Dividend Restriction  58,329 0.434 0.496 0 1 
Total # of Covenants 58,329 2.392 2.870 0 13 
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Table 2.3 Spread difference on all covenants 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Debt to EBITDA -12.81 -7.078 -7.492 
  
 
(-1.162) (-0.634) (-0.711) 
  Interest Coverage -4.324 -2.533 -1.795 
  
 
(-0.400) (-0.235) (-0.167) 
  Debt to Net Worth 52.63*** 54.16*** 52.27*** 
 
53.24*** 
 
(2.648) (2.740) (2.653) 
 
(2.809) 
Fixed Charge Coverage -12.28 -9.708 -3.847 
  
 
(-0.851) (-0.675) (-0.270) 
  Leverage Ratio -5.771 -0.648 -2.076 
  
 
(-0.571) (-0.0635) (-0.206) 
  Net Worth -32.99** -30.07** -29.56** 
 
-27.93** 
 
(-2.380) (-2.176) (-2.118) 
 
(-2.050) 
Asset Sales Sweep -89.16*** -101.0*** 
 
-103.7*** -28.66 
 
(-2.720) (-3.072) 
 
(-3.142) (-1.244) 
Debt Issuance Sweep 78.08 74.66 
 
73.86 
 
 
(1.296) (1.246) 
 
(1.230) 
 Equity Issuance Sweep 24.14 23.88 
 
20.72 
 
 
(0.498) (0.495) 
 
(0.431) 
 Excess CF Sweep 53.10 54.16 
 
46.38 
 
 
(0.631) (0.648) 
 
(0.560) 
 Insurance Sweep 55.33 60.17 
 
58.68 
 
 
(1.292) (1.412) 
 
(1.384) 
 Dividend Restrictions -10.52 -10.34 
 
-9.465 
 
 
(-0.994) (-0.983) 
 
(-0.948) 
 Refinancing loan 
 
-26.53*** -25.01** -30.17*** -28.71*** 
  
(-2.716) (-2.585) (-3.203) (-3.058) 
Secured -21.14*** -23.19*** -21.60*** -18.86*** -19.51*** 
 
(-2.645) (-2.907) (-2.698) (-2.613) (-2.711) 
Size -6.744* -4.183 -4.317 -4.692 -2.993 
 
(-1.763) (-1.068) (-1.134) (-1.222) (-0.783) 
Maturity -65.05*** -60.17*** -60.12*** -58.33*** -60.33*** 
 
(-5.439) (-5.005) (-4.958) (-4.844) (-4.998) 
Observations 633 633 633 633 633 
Adjusted R-squared 0.335 0.343 0.329 0.336 0.334 
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Table 2.4 Spread difference on individual covenants 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Covenant Name 
Debt to 
EBITDA 
Interest 
Coverage 
Debt to 
Net 
Worth 
Fixed 
Charge 
Coverage 
Leverage 
Ratio 
Net 
Worth 
Asset 
Sales 
Sweep 
Excess 
CF 
Sweep 
Debt 
Issuance 
Sweep 
Equity 
Issuance 
Sweep 
Insurance 
Sweep 
Dividend 
Restriction 
             Covenant -7.162 -1.797 42.16** -4.360 -5.674 -17.61 -31.38 89.43 44.07* 30.88 29.31 -11.67 
 
(-0.795) (-0.187) (2.291) (-0.316) (-0.602) (-1.326) (-1.347) (1.477) (1.706) (1.258) (0.846) (-1.192) 
Refinancing -27.37*** -28.37*** -28.83*** -28.37*** -27.82*** -27.71*** -30.37*** -28.80*** -27.16*** -27.59*** -28.46*** -27.69*** 
 
(-2.877) (-2.998) (-3.084) (-3.013) (-2.935) (-2.948) (-3.207) (-3.072) (-2.888) (-2.931) (-3.032) (-2.943) 
Secured -18.20** -17.15** -15.85** -17.31** -18.01** -18.60** -17.44** -17.00** -16.21** -16.07** -16.81** -18.42** 
 
(-2.481) (-2.354) (-2.223) (-2.379) (-2.438) (-2.564) (-2.439) (-2.382) (-2.269) (-2.241) (-2.352) (-2.538) 
Size -4.839 -4.937 -3.778 -4.992 -5.195 -5.113 -3.696 -5.254 -6.221 -5.690 -5.042 -5.209 
 
(-1.296) (-1.318) (-1.007) (-1.331) (-1.378) (-1.369) (-0.964) (-1.406) (-1.634) (-1.503) (-1.349) (-1.392) 
Maturity -1.674*** -1.673*** -1.677*** -1.668*** -1.664*** -1.698*** -1.684*** -1.668*** -1.653*** -1.659*** -1.668*** -1.696*** 
 
(-4.358) (-4.351) (-4.385) (-4.340) (-4.328) (-4.420) (-4.387) (-4.348) (-4.310) (-4.320) (-4.342) (-4.411) 
Term Loan 4.959 3.358 3.649 3.422 3.158 3.246 4.973 2.486 0.721 1.461 2.243 2.964 
 
(0.432) (0.297) (0.325) (0.303) (0.280) (0.288) (0.439) (0.221) (0.0635) (0.129) (0.198) (0.263) 
             Observations 633 633 633 633 633 633 633 633 633 633 633 633 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.318 0.317 0.324 0.317 0.318 0.320 0.320 0.320 0.321 0.319 0.318 0.319 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
One Digit SIC 
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.5 CDS spread as a control variable 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Covenant Name 
Debt to 
EBITDA 
Interest 
Coverage 
Debt to 
Net Worth 
Fixed 
Charge 
Coverage 
Leverage 
Ratio 
Net Worth 
Asset 
Sales 
Sweep 
Excess CF 
Sweep 
Debt 
Issuance 
Sweep 
Equity 
Issuance 
Sweep 
Insurance 
Sweep 
Dividend 
Restriction 
CDS Spread 0.376*** 0.374*** 0.380*** 0.377*** 0.378*** 0.377*** 0.372*** 0.380*** 0.378*** 0.376*** 0.378*** 0.373*** 
 
(19.06) (19.03) (19.41) (19.13) (19.22) (19.10) (18.78) (19.27) (19.15) (19.31) (19.24) (18.87) 
Covenant 6.942 14.01** 27.87** 10.49 -5.367 3.646 31.51** 18.73 -1.531 120.7*** 33.96* 11.70** 
 
(1.299) (2.465) (2.560) (1.285) (-0.962) (0.462) (2.269) (1.221) (-0.105) (3.396) (1.658) (2.008) 
Refinancing -3.205 -3.621 -2.356 -2.569 -1.382 -2.258 -0.0509 -1.558 -2.153 -2.321 -1.953 -2.795 
 
(-0.564) (-0.644) (-0.421) (-0.457) (-0.244) (-0.401) (-0.00898) (-0.276) (-0.382) (-0.417) (-0.348) (-0.498) 
Secured -1.583 -0.789 -2.266 -1.846 -3.970 -2.532 -2.203 -2.644 -2.942 -3.016 -2.810 -1.255 
 
(-0.362) (-0.183) (-0.535) (-0.426) (-0.903) (-0.585) (-0.519) (-0.621) (-0.689) (-0.716) (-0.662) (-0.291) 
Size -7.784*** -7.397*** -6.977*** -7.490*** -8.010*** -7.681*** -8.954*** -8.282*** -7.684*** -8.220*** -7.898*** -7.428*** 
 
(-3.521) (-3.354) (-3.143) (-3.377) (-3.589) (-3.467) (-3.946) (-3.669) (-3.424) (-3.744) (-3.573) (-3.361) 
Maturity -1.036*** -1.024*** -1.047*** -1.046*** -1.034*** -1.034*** -1.022*** -1.034*** -1.041*** -1.034*** -1.037*** -1.011*** 
 
(-4.542) (-4.509) (-4.612) (-4.587) (-4.528) (-4.521) (-4.491) (-4.533) (-4.558) (-4.578) (-4.550) (-4.434) 
Term Loan 46.75*** 47.89*** 48.32*** 47.98*** 48.11*** 48.29*** 46.99*** 47.05*** 48.33*** 47.29*** 47.05*** 48.90*** 
 
(6.761) (7.049) (7.117) (7.032) (7.049) (7.069) (6.889) (6.830) (7.007) (6.992) (6.868) (7.177) 
             Observations 633 633 633 633 633 633 633 633 633 633 633 633 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.721 0.723 0.723 0.721 0.720 0.720 0.722 0.721 0.720 0.726 0.721 0.722 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
SIC FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
t-statistics in parentheses 
           *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.6 Credit spread with firm-year fixed effects 
      VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Debt to EBITDA -26.70*** 14.61** 28.26*** 
 
16.00** 
 
(-11.58) (2.270) (4.571) 
 
(2.539) 
Interest Coverage -18.26*** -46.61*** -42.59*** 
 
-46.57*** 
 
(-8.474) (-7.355) (-6.780) 
 
(-7.455) 
Capital Expenditure 32.44*** 16.89** 28.81*** 
 
17.28** 
 
(13.77) (2.395) (4.200) 
 
(2.461) 
Debt to Net Worth -24.08*** -17.83 -18.63 
  
 
(-5.153) (-1.117) (-1.167) 
  Fixed Charge Coverage -22.02*** -62.78*** -56.59*** 
 
-61.85*** 
 
(-9.890) (-10.08) (-9.347) 
 
(-10.11) 
Leverage Ratio -22.78*** -1.395 -5.007 
  
 
(-7.156) (-0.138) (-0.496) 
  Net Worth -12.62*** 27.43*** 21.78*** 
 
25.31*** 
 
(-5.423) (3.579) (2.848) 
 
(3.385) 
Asset Sales Sweep 14.53*** 35.34*** 
 
33.75*** 38.60*** 
 
(4.744) (4.690) 
 
(4.475) (5.265) 
Debt Issuance Sweep -3.578 22.53*** 
 
27.54*** 28.06*** 
 
(-1.185) (2.943) 
 
(3.607) (4.124) 
Equity Issuance Sweep 14.79*** 9.189 
 
-1.809 
 
 
(5.483) (1.333) 
 
(-0.265) 
 Excess CF Sweep 14.08*** 6.906 
 
4.756 
 
 
(5.424) (1.060) 
 
(0.744) 
 Insurance Sweep 4.680* -12.93* 
 
-18.41** -12.65* 
 
(1.664) (-1.791) 
 
(-2.557) (-1.762) 
Dividend Restrictions -21.22*** -7.159 
 
-20.19*** -7.029 
 
(-10.53) (-1.286) 
 
(-3.796) (-1.267) 
Secured 61.16*** -49.75*** -46.70*** -48.94*** -49.26*** 
 
(23.99) (-7.901) (-7.461) (-7.770) (-7.852) 
Size -0.0878 -15.88*** -12.22*** -16.99*** -15.66*** 
 
(-0.102) (-7.245) (-5.664) (-7.762) (-7.176) 
Maturity -0.430*** 0.653*** 0.638*** 0.632*** 0.653*** 
 
(-12.53) (13.88) (13.58) (13.42) (13.91) 
Term 62.95*** 42.15*** 42.81*** 42.95*** 42.23*** 
 
(50.41) (33.29) (33.82) (33.87) (33.37) 
Observations 58,328 58,328 58,328 58,328 58,328 
Adjusted R-squared 0.545 0.651 0.649 0.648 0.650 
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Table 2.7 Credit spread firm-year fixed effect on individual covenants 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
VARIABLES 
Debt to 
EBITDA 
Interest 
Coverage 
Capital 
Expenditure  
Debt to 
Net 
Worth 
Fixed 
Charge 
Coverage 
Leverage 
Ratio 
Net 
Worth 
Asset 
Sales 
Sweep 
Excess 
CF 
Sweep 
Debt 
Issuance 
Sweep 
Equity 
Issuance 
Sweep 
Insurance 
Sweep 
Dividend 
Restriction 
              
Covenant 9.705* -25.02*** 13.39* -2.079 -49.66*** -18.76 10.30 44.64*** 48.75*** 38.84*** 30.35*** 29.78*** 8.791 
 
(1.690) (-4.044) (1.769) (-0.105) (-7.435) (-1.496) (1.073) (7.822) (8.435) (6.156) (4.908) (4.733) (1.502) 
Secured -49.67*** -48.84*** -50.18*** -49.46*** -48.00*** -49.67*** -49.53*** -54.25*** -51.31*** -51.11*** -52.37*** -52.59*** -49.80*** 
 
(-6.892) (-6.778) (-6.953) (-6.863) (-6.666) (-6.892) (-6.873) (-7.511) (-7.129) (-7.094) (-7.246) (-7.271) (-6.908) 
Size -16.68*** -14.55*** -16.53*** -16.13*** -15.33*** -15.95*** -16.24*** -19.72*** -20.38*** -18.40*** -18.41*** -17.77*** -16.36*** 
 
(-6.217) (-5.406) (-6.186) (-6.058) (-5.757) (-5.982) (-6.092) (-7.307) (-7.528) (-6.848) (-6.814) (-6.619) (-6.132) 
Maturity 0.709*** 0.715*** 0.711*** 0.711*** 0.714*** 0.712*** 0.711*** 0.709*** 0.714*** 0.714*** 0.701*** 0.708*** 0.711*** 
 
(14.60) (14.73) (14.64) (14.64) (14.71) (14.65) (14.64) (14.61) (14.73) (14.71) (14.43) (14.59) (14.63) 
Term Loan 41.21*** 41.09*** 41.21*** 41.20*** 40.91*** 41.19*** 41.22*** 41.02*** 40.90*** 41.02*** 41.04*** 41.13*** 41.24*** 
 
(32.54) (32.45) (32.54) (32.53) (32.32) (32.52) (32.55) (32.42) (32.33) (32.41) (32.40) (32.49) (32.56) 
              
Observations 58,331 58,331 58,331 58,331 58,331 58,331 58,331 58,331 58,331 58,331 58,331 58,331 58,331 
Adjusted R-squared 0.659 0.659 0.659 0.659 0.659 0.659 0.659 0.659 0.660 0.659 0.659 0.659 0.659 
Firm-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
t-statistics in parentheses 
            
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.8. Credit spread firm-year fixed effect on covenants by groups 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
    
     Performace Covenants -25.07*** 
  
-50.09*** 
 
(-4.655) 
  
(-8.097) 
Capital Covenants 
 
9.377 
 
19.16*** 
  
(1.496) 
 
(2.721) 
Non-financial 
Covenants 
  
43.26*** 55.43*** 
   
(7.936) (9.555) 
Secured -49.04*** -50.00*** -52.96*** -54.27*** 
 
(-6.808) (-6.931) (-7.346) (-7.530) 
Size -14.73*** -16.52*** -19.78*** -18.77*** 
 
(-5.500) (-6.173) (-7.327) (-6.949) 
Maturity 0.716*** 0.711*** 0.717*** 0.729*** 
 
(14.75) (14.65) (14.78) (15.04) 
Term 41.00*** 41.22*** 40.93*** 40.48*** 
 
(32.37) (32.55) (32.34) (32.00) 
     Observations 58,331 58,331 58,331 58,331 
Adjusted R-squared 0.659 0.659 0.659 0.660 
Firm-Year FE YES YES YES YES 
t-statistics in 
parentheses 
   
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.9 Effects of covenant on term loans versus credit lines 
VARIABLES All Term Loan Credit Line 
Debt to EBITDA 15.99** 28.80* -12.07 
 
(2.486) (1.861) (-1.545) 
Interest Coverage -45.64*** -63.97*** -15.58** 
 
(-7.208) (-4.452) (-2.139) 
Capital Expenditure 18.70*** 17.91 16.25** 
 
(2.653) (1.211) (2.037) 
Debt to Net Worth -11.24 -28.42 1.305 
 
(-0.704) (-0.523) (0.0896) 
Fixed Charge Coverage -61.57*** -37.49** -31.38*** 
 
(-9.896) (-2.458) (-4.345) 
Leverage Ratio -0.424 18.89 -34.02*** 
 
(-0.0421) (0.638) (-3.403) 
Net Worth 27.45*** 35.01 21.34*** 
 
(3.587) (1.639) (2.857) 
Asset Sales Sweep 38.06*** 48.25** 24.21*** 
 
(5.050) (2.434) (2.941) 
Debt Issuance Sweep 19.70** -5.827 20.46** 
 
(2.573) (-0.317) (2.399) 
Equity Issuance Sweep 6.105 -4.610 4.628 
 
(0.885) (-0.298) (0.581) 
Excess CF Sweep 8.334 -17.48 15.78** 
 
(1.280) (-1.211) (1.995) 
Insurance Sweep -12.84* -11.83 -29.46*** 
 
(-1.780) (-0.707) (-3.594) 
Dividend Restrictions -2.608 9.004 3.029 
 
(-0.466) (0.579) (0.528) 
Secured -49.29*** -48.33** -32.54*** 
 
(-7.836) (-2.449) (-4.893) 
Size -13.97*** -28.50*** -5.771** 
 
(-6.342) (-5.745) (-2.166) 
Maturity 0.663*** 2.833*** -0.452*** 
 
(14.12) (26.18) (-7.649) 
Term 41.97*** 
  
 
(33.18) 
  Refinancing -29.04*** -33.59*** -20.17*** 
 
(-7.558) (-4.051) (-4.677) 
Observations 58,331 24,982 33,349 
Adjusted R-squared 0.651 0.553 0.689 
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Chapter 3. Covenant Strictness Measures 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Convents are an important topic in loan contracting. In general, covenants are 
restrictions that lenders put on borrowers in a loan contract to reduce the risk of the loan, 
while lenders sacrifice financial flexibility in return of a large amount of capital.  In 
general, by using covenants, lenders are able to transfer control of the assets during 
covenant violation. As a result, if the covenants in loan contract are aggregately stricter, 
the borrower is more likely to have a covenant violation. A loan contract with a stricter 
set of convents is considered a stricter contract. Therefore it is very important to 
understand and measure convent strictness to facilitate a wide range of research based on 
loan strictness. The importance and demand of measuring covenant strictness becomes 
increasingly relevant.  
Recently research on banking, accounting and financial intermediation has 
proposed several different types of covenant strictness measures. These measures reflect 
different important areas of covenant strictness. In this paper, I examine the effectiveness 
these covenant measures and how well they perform in measuring the loan risk using 
syndicated loan ratings and loan spreads. There exist three major categories of strictness 
measures.    
First, if a loan contract has more covenants, limiting more of the borrower’s 
financial flexibility, such contract is considered stricter as it essentially gives the lender 
more potential control. Simply put, a contract with two convents should be stricter than 
another contract with a single covenant. For example, a loan with both interest coverage 
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ratio covenant and dividend restriction covenant is stricter than a loan with only interest 
coverage ratio covenant. The Covenant Intensity Index (CII) by Bradley and Roberts’s 
(2004) captures this idea. Although CII incorporates collateral information and puts more 
weight on non-financial covenants.  In another example, Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) 
use covenant counts as strictness measures relating to borrower restrictions through 
performance versus capital covenants.  
Second, specifically for financial covenants, covenant strictness should also 
reflect how close the initial financial ratios to the thresholds set in the covenants, also 
known as initial financial slacks. A covenant is stricter if the slack is small, which means 
a small distance between the negotiated minimum or maximum level and the existing 
accounting numbers of the borrower. An obvious limitation of this measure is that only 
the slack of a single covenant can be measured at a time. Therefore, this measure fails to 
capture the effect of other covenants coexisting in the contract. Often, the measure 
restricts the sample to having to have the specific covenant in the contract therefore 
generating a nonrandom subsample which may be biased based on the covenant being 
used. For example, Drucker and Puri (2009) use net worth covenant slack alone as the 
covenant strictness measure; and Demiroglu (2010) measures covenant strictness based 
on the  tightness of current ratio slack and debt to EBITDA ratio slack.  
Third, Murfin (2012) created a covenant strictness measure based on the 
probability of financial covenant violation, a more comprehensive measure focusing on 
the likelihood of violating the set of financial covenants existing in the contract.  Murfin 
includes 10 financial ratios and calculated the joint probability of covenants. Demerjian 
and Owens (2015) expanded his method to a larger scale by incorporating 15 financial 
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covenants available in the Dealscan database and also minimize measurement errors by 
standardizing covenant definitions. The idea of the probability of covenant violation 
incorporates both the number of covenants and the slack. In addition, this measure takes 
into account the scale of the slack and the correlation between different covenants 
existing in the same contract. However, this measure, like any measures involving slack, 
only looks at financial covenants, while the effect of non-financial covenant is yet to be 
measured.  
Generally speaking, if a covenant strictness measure correctly captures the overall 
strictness of a loan contract, it should also capture the riskiness of the loan. That is, if a 
contract is stricter, it should be less risky. And a good covenant strictness measure should 
reflect that. Therefore, in order to test the performance of the strictness measure, I 
propose three variables that measures loan risk.  
First, credit ratings are a direct variable that measure of credit risk. I use the 
difference between the loan rating and the borrower rating as a measure of the loan risk. 
This difference is therefore free of firm level variation and should be determined solely 
by loan characteristics (Ding 2016). Therefore, the rating difference works as one 
accurate benchmark for the covenant strictness measure.  
Second, credit spread measures the credit risk of loans and the issuing borrowers, 
while CDS spread measures the credit risk of the borrower. As a result, the difference 
between loan credit spread and CDS spread measures the credit risk specific to the loan, 
therefore making it another good benchmark for the covenant strictness measure. A larger 
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difference between the spreads indicates a higher loan risk. Accordingly, an accurate 
covenant strictness measure should capture the variation in this difference. 
Third, while the CDS spreads are not available, another way of identifying the 
variations of loan-level risk by looking at the credit spread of multiple loans within the 
same firm, where I no longer need to control for firm level variation as the loans are from 
the same issuers. Therefore, with a sample size large enough and with enough issuers 
with multiple loans, I use credit spread directly as a benchmark for the covenant 
strictness measure.  
Besides the covenant strictness measure from each of the three categories, I 
construct another measure by simply adding up the total number of covenants as a 
reference.  Then I test these strictness measures against the different measures for credit 
risk while controlling for loan characteristics.  
There are three major types of covenants: affirmative covenants, negative 
covenants and financial covenants. Affirmative covenants state the actions borrowers 
must take while the loan is outstanding. For example, these covenants often require a 
borrower to pay the lender interest and fees, provide audited financial statements, 
maintain insurance, and pay taxes. Affirmative covenants are bare minimum 
requirements and exist in virtually all loan contracts, so most loan databases do not report 
them separately. Consequently, they are not included in this study as they do not differ 
across different loans. 
Negative covenants restrict a borrower’s actions in a particular way; for example, 
they might restrict the type and the amount of acquisitions, new issues, and asset sales. 
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They may also require mandatory prepayments, such as using the proceeds of a debt issue, 
asset sale, or equity issue to prepay the loan. In this paper, I refer to negative covenants as 
non-financial covenants. Financial covenants, traditionally known as maintenance 
covenants, are often more restrictive than non-financial covenants. They require 
borrowers to maintain stipulated levels of a financial ratio or value, such as minimum 
interest coverage ratio and minimum net worth. If the borrower fails this test, it is then in 
technical default. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides 
information about data, variables, and summary statistics. Section 3.3 introduces different 
empirical setups and presents the results and explanations. Section 3.4 concludes.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
3.2 Data, Variables and Summary Statistics 
 
In this paper, I gather the characteristics of syndicated loans issued between 1995 
and 2012 from the LPC Dealscan database. I record covenants, collateral, maturity, loan 
type, loan size, starting and ending dates, and one-digit SIC industry code. Next, I 
calculated the total number of covenants and use it as one simple measure of covenant 
strictness.  
I then follow the specifications of Bradley and Roberts’s (2004) to construct the 
Covenant Intensity Index (CII). The value of CII index ranges from 0 to 6. It weighs non-
financial covenants more than financial covenants. Having one, two or three of equity 
issuance sweep, debt issuance sweep or asset sales sweep adds one, two or three points to 
CII. Having the divined restriction adds one point. If the total number of financial 
covenants is equal or more than two, CII gains another point.  Having collateral also adds 
one point. Therefore, out of the total possible six points, four points are from non-
financial covenants, while only one point is on financial covenants. While collateral also 
accounts as one point for CII, it is technically not part of the covenants.  
Covenant violation probability is calculated according to Demerjian and Owens 
(2015), where they follow the specifications of Murfin (2012). Starting with one covenant, 
the probability of covenant violation is a function of initial covenant slack and the 
volatility of the financial value of this covenant. Now if there are two covenants, besides 
slack and volatility, we also need to consider the correlation between the two covenants. 
If the correlation is lower, than the probability of violation is higher as those two 
covenants are more likely to be independently violated. If there are N covenants, the 
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probability that at least one covenant is violated is determined by N, the slack on each 
covenant, the volatility of each financial value defined by each covenant, and the 
correlations between the N financial values. With Monte Carlo simulation, the financial 
values of next quarter are simulated for 1000 times and the number of violations from the 
simulation divided by 1000 is exactly the probability of covenant violation. This 
probability of violation is readily available and provided by Demerjian and Owens (2015). 
Now that I have these three covenant strictness measures (total number of 
covenants, CII, probability of violation), I test them against Moody’s credit ratings. As 
stated in the introduction, I take the difference between loan ratings and firm ratings, 
thereby effectively eliminating most firm-level characteristics. Furthermore, while 
existing empirical research primarily examines credit spreads (loan price), I instead focus 
on credit ratings, a direct measure of credit risk. Whereas credit spreads contain firm 
characteristics, the rating difference is free of variations at the firm level.  
Most firms that obtain ratings for their syndicated loans are also rated at the firm 
level. A firm rating is a rating of the senior unsecured debt and debt-like obligations of 
the firm in general. It is not linked to a specific debt contract. In contrast, rating agencies 
rate loans based on the existing firm ratings but incorporate specific risks for the 
particular loan being rated. Since loan ratings include both firm-level and loan-level 
characteristics, I disentangle these two risks by subtracting the firm rating from the loan 
rating, thereby eliminating most firm-level variation. I keep the difference as a measure 
of credit risk specific to a loan. This procedure allows me to explain the variation of this 
difference using loan characteristics. 
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I use Moody's syndicated loan ratings at origination from 1995 to 2012, a period 
when the majority of syndicated loans were rated. In this dataset, each loan has a 
Moody’s unique identifier and a firm level identifier. In order to match loan ratings with 
firm ratings, I manually collect firm ratings using firm identifiers and match the firm 
ratings with the closest rating date to the loan ratings. 
 Moody’s database maintains three types of firm level ratings. The most 
commonly used rating that measures the firm’s credit risk is the long term issuer rating, 
which rates firm’s long term senior unsecured debt and debt-like obligations. However, 
not every firm has a long term issuer rating. For these firms, I use the long term 
unsecured rating if it is available. This rating measures the same credit risk as the long 
term issuer rating. If neither of the above mentioned firm ratings is available, I use the 
long term corporate family rating as a proxy for the issuer rating.  The long term 
corporate family rating is the long term rating that reflects the relative likelihood of a 
default on a corporate family’s debt and debt like obligations and the expected financial 
loss suffered in the event of default. To justify the use of this proxy, I compare the long 
term corporate family rating with the long term issuer rating of the firms where both 
ratings are available. More than 90% of such firms have identical issuer and corporate 
family ratings. For the remaining 10% of firms, the rating difference is less than one 
notch. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, the empirical results are similar when I 
exclude loans using corporate family ratings.  
Next, I match the firm rating to the loan rating by date. I first look for firm rating 
updates up to 365 days before the loan is rated. If an updated firm rating within this range 
cannot be found, then the search range is extended to up to 60 days after the loan was 
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issued, since a recent update of the firm rating immediately following the loan issue is 
likely a more accurate measure of the firm’s condition at the time the loan was rated. If a 
firm rating does not fall into this time window, it does not appear in the sample. I test 
several different window sizes including 180 days before and 30 day after, 90 days before 
and 15 days after, and only ratings before the loan issue. The results are robust across 
different specifications. This procedure generates 7355 unique loans with both loan 
ratings and firm ratings from 1995 to 2012. 
Afterwards, I gather the characteristics of syndicated loans issued between 1995 
and 2012 from the LPC Dealscan database. I record covenants, collateral, maturity, loan 
type, loan size, starting and ending date, and one-digit SIC industry code. Dealscan uses a 
unique identifier, FacilityID, for each issue at the loan level. Since there are no common 
identifiers of loans between Dealscan and Moody’s, I match the loans in two steps 
starting at the firm level. If a firm is publicly traded and has a ticker in both datasets, the 
firm is matched using the ticker. If a firm does not have a ticker, then I match it by the 
firm name manually, checking name changes and subsidiaries. Once both datasets are 
matched on the firm level, I identify each loan using the starting date, ending date, and 
loan type. This procedure yields a sample of 3,597 loans with both ratings and loan 
characteristics.   
As the data for probability of covenant violation is readily available, merging it 
with the with Moody’s rating data yields 1,167 observations. Table 3.1 shows the 
summery statistics. 
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Another benchmark I use to test the validity of the covenant strictness measure is 
the credit spread (All-In-Drawn), obtained from Dealscan database. I exclude all 
refinanced loans and loans with missing data. The merge between the probability of 
covenant violation and credit spread data generates 4018 observations. Table 3.2 shows 
the summary statistics. 
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3.3 Empirical setup and results 
 
First, I use the difference between loan ratings and firm ratings as the dependent 
variable to how each covenant strictness measure predicts the difference. I control for 
loan size and maturity and fixed effects including year, one-digit SIC code, loan purpose 
and firm rating. Firms issue loans for different purposes including general corporate 
purpose, debt refinancing, recapitalization, and LBO or merger and acquisition.  Loans 
with different purposes have varying credit risks and therefore I control for this variation. 
Similarly, firm rating can be an important determinant of the rating difference. Although 
I assign rating scores across the rating scale uniformly, a difference of one notch at 
different rating levels may represent different risks. Therefore, it is important to control 
for firm rating as well. The setup for the basic regression is 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝐹𝐸, 
where measure is the one of the three covenant strictness measures defined in the last 
section including the popular CII. Table 3.3 shows how these covenants strictness 
measures perform in explaining the rating difference.  
In Table 3.3, column (1) shows the effects with no covenant measures, where 
collateral and loan size have a positive impact on credit ratings. I list the effects of 
probability of violation, total number of covenants and CII in columns (2) to (4). A high 
probability of covenant violation translates to a higher relative credit rating, which is 
consistent with the prediction. However neither the total number of covenants nor CII 
produce a positive correlation, suggesting that randomly adding up the number of 
covenants does not seem to be a good measure for strictness. Column (5) show a positive 
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relation for CII in the absence of collateral, as collateral is one component of the CII 
index. Columns (6) to (9) show how probability of violation dominates the other two 
covenant strictness measures.  
Rating agencies construct credit ratings based on the probability of default and 
loss given default. Credit ratings reflect the credit risk based on the analysis and opinions 
by the rating agencies. Another objective measure of credit risk is  the credit spread, 
which is the difference between a risk free rate and the loan yield of the same maturity. 
Therefore credit spread itself is the measure of the market risk of the debt product. 
Generally speaking, a riskier loan will have a higher credit spread as investors need to be 
compensated for the extra risk. Knowing this, I use the credit spread (All-In-Drawn) from 
Dealscan database as the other benchmark for the effectiveness of covenant strictness 
measures. However, credit spread include both loan-level and firm-level credit risk. In 
order to limit the risk variation at the loan level, I apply fixed effects at the firm level, 
therefore eliminating the firm level variation. It is also important to control for time fixed 
effects as market condition varies significantly over time. I therefore control for firm-year 
fixed effects, which addresses the time varying market condition and still allows enough 
variation within each fix-effect subgroup.  
Table 3.4 shows the results of different covenant strictness measures in explaining 
the variation of credit spread. With a similar setup as Table 3.4, column (1) shows the 
basic effect without any strictness measures. The coefficients for collateral and loan size 
are significant and negative, which means having collateral or a larger size translates to a 
lower credit spread, therefore lowering credit risk. Columns (2) to (4) list the effect of 
three covenant strictness measures. Surprisingly they are all positive and significant. First 
66 
 
of all, a higher probability of violation should indeed translate into higher risk, hence 
higher spread. A large number of covenants and a high CII also seem to be associated 
with high credit spread, which means the market thinks a loan with a large number of 
covenants means higher risk. However, once I put all three measures into one regression, 
only total number of covenants drives the effect.  
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3.4 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I present three major categories of covenant strictness measure and 
compare the pros and cons of each category.  Next, I construct and compare three 
covenants strictness measure using both credit ratings and credit spread as benchmark. 
The goal is to test whether these measures accurately reflect the overall risk of loans.  
The result suggests that the strictness measure using the probability of covenant 
violation best explains loan risk. A simple or arbitrary count of covenants fails to do the 
job. However, the probability of covenant violation is not without limitations. There are 
certainly more area to explore without limiting the strictness solely to the likelihood of 
violation. 
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3.5 Tables 
 
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics: Credit Rating Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
            
Firm Rating Score 1,167 8.612 2.532 2 18 
Loan Rating Score 1,167 9.737 2.016 4 18 
Rating Difference 1,167 1.125 1.216 -2 6 
CII 1,167 4.263 1.870 0 6 
Total # of Covenants 1,167 5.659 2.773 1 12 
Probability of Violation 1,167 0.380 0.418 0 1 
Secured 1,167 0.817 0.386 0 1 
Size 1,167 6.407 1.092 3.219 9.989 
Maturity 1,167 61.26 18.58 3 144 
Term Loan 1,167 0.460 0.499 0 1 
            
      
 
 
Table 3.2 Summary Statistics: Credit Spread 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
            
Credit Spread (All-In-Drawn) 4,060 219.5 143.6 5 1,600 
CII 4,060 3.443 1.830 0 6 
Total # of Covenants 4,060 4.316 2.562 1 11 
Probability of Violation 4,060 0.407 0.428 0 1 
Secured 4,060 0.740 0.439 0 1 
Size 4,060 5.084 1.676 -0.734 9.989 
Maturity 4,018 48.17 25.67 1 252 
Term Loan 4,060 0.347 0.476 0 1 
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Table 3.3 Test strictness measures with credit rating difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
                    
Probability of Violation 
 
0.246*** 
   
0.333*** 0.292*** 
 
0.339*** 
  
(2.884) 
   
(3.851) (3.399) 
 
(3.909) 
Total # of Covenants 
  
-0.0613*** 
  
-0.0748*** 
 
-0.0814*** -0.102*** 
   
(-3.866) 
  
(-4.636) 
 
(-2.595) (-3.233) 
Covenant Intensity Index 
   
-0.0778*** 0.124*** 
 
-0.0917*** 0.0386 0.0521 
    
(-2.952) (5.449) 
 
(-3.456) (0.743) (1.007) 
Secured 1.403*** 1.332*** 1.603*** 1.628*** 
 
1.550*** 1.583*** 1.557*** 1.487*** 
 
(13.71) (12.68) (14.05) (12.79) 
 
(13.58) (12.44) (12.00) (11.43) 
Size 0.106*** 0.122*** 0.0895*** 0.0937*** 0.0737** 0.108*** 0.111*** 0.0903*** 0.109*** 
 
(3.140) (3.580) (2.641) (2.757) (2.018) (3.166) (3.234) (2.662) (3.203) 
Maturity -0.00283 -0.00218 -0.00144 -0.00203 0.00275 -0.000243 -0.00111 -0.00138 -0.000143 
 
(-1.346) (-1.031) (-0.678) (-0.960) (1.230) (-0.114) (-0.522) (-0.650) (-0.0670) 
Term Loan -0.110 -0.121* -0.0896 -0.0931 -0.0563 -0.0998 -0.103 -0.0912 -0.102 
 
(-1.586) (-1.747) (-1.296) (-1.343) (-0.755) (-1.453) (-1.492) (-1.320) (-1.488) 
          Observations 1,167 1,167 1,167 1,167 1,167 1,167 1,167 1,167 1,167 
Adjusted R-squared 0.297 0.302 0.306 0.302 0.192 0.315 0.309 0.306 0.315 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
One Digit SIC FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
t-statistics in parentheses 
        
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.4 Test strictness measures with credit spread 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
         
Probability of Violation 
 
52.85*** 
   
31.12 42.53** 31.12 32.45 
  
(2.766) 
   
(1.579) (2.211) (1.579) (1.640) 
Total # of Covenants 
  
17.85*** 
  
16.20*** 
 
16.20*** 12.65** 
   
(4.723) 
  
(4.133) 
 
(4.133) (2.129) 
Covenant Intensity Index 
   
25.80*** 16.69*** 
 
23.67*** 
 
7.858 
    
(3.991) (2.792) 
 
(3.625) 
 
(0.795) 
Secured -45.82** -45.37** -61.40*** -80.66*** 
 
-59.69*** -77.41*** -59.69*** -67.19*** 
 
(-2.214) (-2.198) (-2.952) (-3.608) 
 
(-2.868) (-3.460) (-2.868) (-2.940) 
Size 
-
32.73*** -32.75*** -50.41*** -44.91*** -39.79*** -48.78*** -43.91*** -48.78*** -48.98*** 
 
(-4.264) (-4.277) (-5.939) (-5.462) (-4.892) (-5.709) (-5.340) (-5.709) (-5.728) 
Maturity 0.0383 0.0237 0.0177 0.0596 0.0243 0.0110 0.0461 0.0110 0.0212 
 
(0.348) (0.215) (0.162) (0.543) (0.222) (0.101) (0.420) (0.101) (0.192) 
Term 27.32*** 27.40*** 27.17*** 26.90*** 26.69*** 27.23*** 27.00*** 27.23*** 27.14*** 
 
(8.093) (8.136) (8.110) (8.008) (7.912) (8.132) (8.048) (8.132) (8.097) 
          Observations 4,018 4,018 4,018 4,018 4,018 4,018 4,018 4,018 4,018 
Adjusted R-squared 0.796 0.797 0.800 0.799 0.797 0.800 0.799 0.800 0.800 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
One Digit SIC FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
t-statistics in parentheses 
        
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A Variable Definition 
Variable  Source Description 
Firm ratings Moody's Aaa to C, 21 notches. Moody's long term issuer rating. Long 
term unsecured rating and long term corporate family ratings 
are used when not available 
Loan rating Moody's Aaa to C, 21 notches. Moody's syndicated loan rating at 
origination 
Firm score Calculated Assigned loan rating score according to raing notch. Ranges 
from 21(Aaa) to 1 
Loan score  Calculated Assigned firm rating score according to raing notch. Ranges 
from 21(Aaa) to 1 
Rating difference  Calculated Dependent variable. Equals Loan score minus Firm score 
Size Dealscan log(Facility amount) 
Type Dealscan Indicator variable equals 1 if term loan 
Secured Dealscan Indicator variable equals 1 if loan is secured (has collateral) 
Asset sales sweep Dealscan Indicator variable equals 1 if asset sales sweep covenant exists 
Debt issuance sweep Dealscan Indicator variable equals 1 if debt issuance sweep covenant 
exists 
Equity issuance 
sweep 
Dealscan Indicator variable equals 1 if equity issuance sweep covenant 
exists 
Excess CF sweep Dealscan Indicator variable equals 1 if excess cash flow sweep covenant 
exists 
Insurance proceeds 
sweep 
Dealscan Indicator variable equals 1 if insurance proceeds sweep 
covenant exists 
Dividend restrictions Dealscan Indicator variable equals 1 if dividend restrictions covenant 
exists 
Debt to EBITDA Dealscan Indicator variable equals 1 if debt to EBITDA covenant exists 
Interest coverage Dealscan Indicator variable equals 1 if interest coverage covenant exists 
Capex Dealscan Indicator variable equals 1 if capex covenant exists 
Fixed charge 
coverage 
Dealscan Indicator variable equals 1 if fixed charge coverage covenant 
exists 
Leverage ratio Dealscan Indicator variable equals 1 if leverage ratio covenant exists 
Net worth Dealscan Indicator variable equals 1 if net worth covenant exists 
SIC Dealscan One digit SIC code 
Year Dealscan The year the loan is issued 
Purpose Dealscan Primary purpose field in the Facility table of Dealscan database 
i-rated Moody's Indicator variable equals 1 if firm rating is investment grade, 
i.e >= Baa3 
Ba-rated Moody's Indicator variable equals 1 if firm rating is between Ba1 and 
Ba3 
B-rated Moody's Indicator variable equals 1 if firm rating is between B1 and B3 
C-rated Moody's Indicator variable equals 1 if firm rating is equal or below Caa1 
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Appendix B Correlations between Covenants 
P < 0.001 
  
Min. 
Interest 
Coverage 
Max. 
Debt to 
EBITDA 
Max. 
Capex 
Asset 
Sales 
Sweep 
Debt 
Issuance 
Sweep 
Insurance 
Proceeds 
Sweep 
Dividend 
Restrictions 
Min. 
Interest 
Coverage 
1 0.6491 0.47636 0.5048 0.47789 0.44388 0.50625 
Max. Debt 
to EBITDA 
0.6491 1 0.53396 0.68428 0.6568 0.6175 0.66813 
Max. 
Capex 
0.47636 0.53396 1 0.63822 0.63265 0.58207 0.57099 
Asset Sales 
Sweep 
0.5048 0.68428 0.63822 1 0.87765 0.83173 0.79642 
Debt 
Issuance 
Sweep 
0.47789 0.6568 0.63265 0.87765 1 0.79977 0.72418 
Insurance 
Proceeds 
Sweep 
0.44388 0.6175 0.58207 0.83173 0.79977 1 0.6909 
Dividend 
Restrictions 
0.50625 0.66813 0.57099 0.79642 0.72418 0.6909 1 
 
 
 
 
